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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus MONASKY v. TAGLIERI CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 18–935.

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019  Syllabus NOTE:   Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is  being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.  The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been  prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.  See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus MONASKY v. TAGLIERI CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 18–935.    Argued December 11, 2019—Decided February 25, 2020 The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Ab-duction  (Hague  Convention  or  Convention),  implemented  in  the  United States by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22U. S. C. §9001 et seq., provides that a child wrongfully removed from her country of "habitual residence" ordinarily must be returned to that country.Petitioner  Monasky,  a  U.  S.  citizen,  asserts  that  her  Italian  hus-band, respondent Taglieri, became abusive after the couple moved to Italy from the United States.  Two months after the birth of the cou-ple's daughter, A. M. T., in Italy, Monasky fled with the infant to Ohio. Taglieri petitioned the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for A. M. T.'s return to Italy under the Convention, pursuant to22 U. S. C. §9003(b), on the ground that the child had been wrongfullyremoved from her country of "habitual residence."  The District Court granted Taglieri's petition, concluding that the parents' shared intentwas for their daughter to live in Italy.  Then two-year-old A. M. T. was returned to Italy.  The en banc Sixth Circuit affirmed.  Under its prec-edent, the court first noted, an infant's habitual residence depends on the  parents'  shared  intent.    It  then  reviewed  the  District  Court's  habitual-residence  determination  for  clear  error  and  found  none.    In  doing so, the court rejected Monasky's argument that Italy could not qualify  as  A.  M.  T.'s  "habitual  residence"  in  the  absence  of  an  actual  agreement by her parents to raise her there. Held: 1. A child's habitual residence depends on the totality of the circum-stances specific to the case, not on categorical requirements such as anactual agreement between the parents.  Pp. 7–14.(a) The inquiry begins with the Convention's text "and the context 
2                                     MONASKY                                     v. TAGLIERI Syllabus in which the written words are used."  Air France v. Saks, 470 U. S. 392, 397.  The Convention does not define "habitual residence," but, as the Convention's text and explanatory report indicate, a child habitu-ally  resides  where  she  is  at  home.    This  fact-driven  inquiry  must  be"sensitive  to  the  unique  circumstances  of  the  case  and  informed  by  common sense."  Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F. 3d 729, 744.  Acclima-tion of older children and the intentions and circumstances of caregiv-ing parents are relevant considerations, but no single fact is dispositiveacross  all  cases.    The  treaty's  "negotiation  and  drafting  history"  cor-roborates  that  habitual  residence  depends  on  the  specific  circum-stances of the particular case.  Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S. 491, 507. This interpretation also aligns with habitual-residence determinationsmade by other nations party to the Convention.  Pp. 7–12.(b) Monasky's arguments in favor of an actual-agreement require-ment are unpersuasive.  While an infant's "mere physical presence" is not  a  dispositive  indicator  of  an  infant's  habitual  residence,  a  wide  range of facts other than an actual agreement, including those indicat-ing that the parents have made their home in a particular place, can enable a trier to determine whether an infant's residence has the qual-ity of being "habitual."  Nor is adjudicating a dispute over whether an agreement existed a more expeditious way of promoting returns of ab-ducted  children  and  deterring  would-be  abductors  than  according  courts leeway to consider all the circumstances.  Finally, imposing a categorical actual-agreement requirement is unlikely to be an appro-priate solution to the serious problem of protecting children born into domestic violence, for it would leave many infants without a habitualresidence, and therefore outside the Convention's domain.  Domestic violence should be an issue fully explored in the custody adjudication upon  the  child's  return.    The  Convention  also  has  a  mechanism  for  guarding  children  from  the  harms  of  domestic  violence:  Article  13(b)allows a court to refrain from ordering a child's return to her habitualresidence if "there is a grave risk that [the child's] return would exposethe child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation."  Pp. 12–14.2.  A  first-instance  habitual-residence  determination  is  subject  to  deferential  appellate  review  for  clear  error.    A  trial  court's  habitual-residence determination presents a mixed question of law and fact that is heavily fact laden.  The determination thus presents a task for fact-finding courts and should be judged on appeal by a clear-error review standard.  See U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U. S. ___,  ___–___.   There  is  no  "historical  tradition"  indicating  otherwise.  Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 558.  Clear-error review has a par-ticular virtue in Hague Convention cases: By speeding up appeals, it serves  the  Convention's  emphasis  on  expedition.    Notably,  courts  of  
3 Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) Syllabus other treaty partners also review first-instance habitual-residence de-terminations deferentially.  Pp. 14–16. 3. Given the circumstances of this case, it is unnecessary to disturb the judgment below and remand the case to give the lower courts an opportunity   to   apply   the   governing   totality-of-the-circumstances   standard in the first instance.  Pp. 16–17. 907 F. 3d 404, affirmed. GINSBURG, J., delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS, C. J., and  BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Parts I, III, and IV. THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J., filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. 
_________________ _________________ 1 Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) Opinion of the Court NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.    Readers  are  requested  to  notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 18–935 MICHELLE MONASKY, PETITIONER v. DOMENICO TAGLIERI ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT [February 25, 2020] JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of In-ternational Child Abduction (Hague Convention or Conven-tion), Oct. 25, 1980, T. I. A. S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–11  (Treaty  Doc.),  a  child  wrongfully  removed  from  hercountry of "habitual residence" ordinarily must be returnedto that country.  This case concerns the standard for deter-mining a child's "habitual residence" and the standard for reviewing  that  determination  on  appeal.    The  petitioner,Michelle Monasky, is a U. S. citizen who brought her infant daughter, A. M. T., to the United States from Italy after her Italian  husband,  Domenico  Taglieri,  became  abusive  to  Monasky.    Taglieri  successfully  petitioned  the  District  Court  for  A.  M.  T.'s  return  to  Italy  under  the  Convention,  and  the  Court  of  Appeals  affirmed  the  District  Court's  order. Monasky assails the District Court's determination that Italy was A. M. T.'s habitual residence.  First of the ques-tions presented: Could Italy qualify as A. M. T.'s "habitual residence"  in  the  absence  of  an  actual  agreement  by  her  parents to raise her there?  The second question: Should the 
2                                     MONASKY                                     v. TAGLIERI Opinion of the Court Court of Appeals have reviewed the District Court's habitual-residence  determination  independently  rather  than  def-  erentially?  In accord with decisions of the courts of other countries party to the Convention, we hold that a child's ha-bitual  residence  depends  on  the  totality  of  the  circum-stances specific to the case.  An actual agreement betweenthe parents is not necessary to establish an infant's habit-ual residence.  We further hold that a first-instance habitual-residence  determination  is  subject  to  deferential  appel-  late review for clear error. I A The  Hague  Conference  on  Private  International  Law  adopted  the  Hague  Convention  in  1980  "[t]o  address  the  problem of international child abductions during domestic disputes." Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, 4 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  One hundred one coun-tries, including the United States and Italy, are Convention signatories.  Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Con-vention of 25 Oct. 1980 on the Civil Aspects of Int'l Child Ab-duction, Status Table, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/ conventions/status-table/?cid=24.  The International Child Abduction   Remedies   Act   (ICARA),   102   Stat.   437,   as   amended,  22  U.  S.  C.  §9001  et seq.,  implements  our  Na-tion's obligations under the Convention.  It is the Conven-tion's core premise that "the interests of children . . . in mat-ters relating to their custody" are best served when custodydecisions are made in the child's country of "habitual resi-dence."  Convention Preamble, Treaty Doc., at 7; see Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U. S. 1, 20 (2010). To  that  end,  the  Convention  ordinarily  requires  theprompt  return  of  a  child  wrongfully  removed  or  retainedaway from the country in which she habitually resides.  Art. 12, Treaty Doc., at 9 (cross-referencing Art. 3, id., at 7).  The removal or retention is wrongful if done in violation of the 
3 Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) Opinion of the Court custody laws of the child's habitual residence.  Art. 3, ibid. The Convention recognizes certain exceptions to the returnobligation.   Prime  among  them,  a  child's  return  is  not  inorder if the return would place her at a "grave risk" of harmor  otherwise  in  "an  intolerable  situation."    Art.  13(b), id., at 10. The  Convention's  return  requirement  is  a  "provisional"  remedy  that  fixes  the  forum  for  custody  proceedings.    Sil-berman, Interpreting the Hague Abduction Convention: InSearch of a Global Jurisprudence, 38 U. C. D. L. Rev. 1049, 1054 (2005).  Upon the child's return, the custody adjudica-tion will proceed in that forum.  See ibid. To avoid delayingthe custody proceeding, the Convention instructs contract-ing  states  to  "use  the  most  expeditious  procedures  avail-able" to return the child to her habitual residence.  Art. 2, Treaty Doc., at 7.  See also Art. 11, id., at 9 (prescribing sixweeks as normal time for return-order decisions). B In  2011,  Monasky  and  Taglieri  were  married  in  theUnited  States.    Two  years  later,  they  relocated  to  Italy,where  they  both  found  work.    Neither  then  had  definite  plans to return to the United States.  During their first yearin Italy, Monasky and Taglieri lived together in Milan.  But the marriage soon deteriorated.  Taglieri became physically abusive,  Monasky  asserts,  and  "forced  himself  upon  [her]  multiple times."  907 F. 3d 404, 406 (CA6 2018) (en banc). About  a  year  after  their  move  to  Italy,  in  May  2014,  Monasky became pregnant.  Taglieri thereafter took up new employment in the town of Lugo, while Monasky, who did not speak Italian, remained about three hours away in Mi-lan.  The long-distance separation and a difficult pregnancy further  strained  their  marriage.    Monasky  looked  into  re-turning  to  the  United  States.    She  applied  for  jobs  there,asked about U. S. divorce lawyers, and obtained cost infor-mation from moving companies.  At the same time, though, 
4                                     MONASKY                                     v. TAGLIERI Opinion of the Court she  and  Taglieri  made  preparations  to  care  for  their  ex-pected child in Italy.  They inquired about childcare options there, made purchases needed for their baby to live in Italy,and found a larger apartment in a Milan suburb. Their  daughter,  A.  M.  T.,  was  born  in  February  2015.Shortly thereafter, Monasky told Taglieri that she wantedto divorce him, a matter they had previously broached, and that she anticipated returning to the United States.  Later, however, she agreed to join Taglieri, together with A. M. T., in Lugo.  The parties dispute whether they reconciled while together in that town.On March 31, 2015, after yet another heated argument,Monasky  fled  with  her  daughter  to  the  Italian  police  and  sought  shelter  in  a  safe  house.   In  a  written  statement  to  the  police,  Monasky  alleged  that  Taglieri  had  abused  her  and that she feared for her life.  Two weeks later, in April2015,  Monasky  and  two-month-old  A.  M.  T.  left  Italy  for  Ohio, where they moved in with Monasky's parents. Taglieri sought recourse in the courts.  With Monasky ab-sent  from  the  proceedings,  an  Italian  court  granted  Ta-glieri's request to terminate Monasky's parental rights, dis-crediting her statement to the Italian police.  App. 183.  In the United States, on May 15, 2015, Taglieri petitioned theU. S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for the return  of  A.  M.  T.  to  Italy  under  the  Hague  Convention,  pursuant to 22 U. S. C. §9003(b), on the ground that Italywas her habitual residence. The District Court granted Taglieri's petition after a four-day  bench  trial.   Sixth  Circuit  precedent  at  the  time,  theDistrict Court observed, instructed courts that a child ha-bitually resides where the child has become "acclimatiz[ed]"to  her  surroundings.    App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  85a  (quoting  Robert v. Tesson, 507 F. 3d 981, 993 (CA6 2007)).  An infant, however,  is  "too  young"  to  acclimate  to  her  surroundings.App. to Pet. for Cert. 87a.  The District Court therefore pro-ceeded  on  the  assumption  that  "the  shared  intent  of  the  
5 Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) Opinion of the Court [parents] is relevant in determining the habitual residenceof  an  infant,"  though  "particular  facts  and  circumstances  . . . might necessitate the consideration [of] other factors." Id., at 97a.  The shared intention of A. M. T.'s parents, the District Court found, was for their daughter to live in Italy, where the parents had established a marital home "with nodefinitive plan to return to the United States." Ibid.  Even if Monasky could change A. M. T.'s habitual residence uni-laterally by making plans to raise A. M. T. away from Italy,the  District  Court  added,  the  evidence  on  that  score  indi-cated  that,  until  the  day  she  fled  her  husband,  Monasky  had  "no  definitive  plans"  to  raise  A.  M.  T.  in  the  United  States.  Id.,  at  98a.   In  line  with  its  findings,  the  District  Court ordered A. M. T.'s prompt return to Italy. The  Sixth  Circuit  and  this  Court  denied  Monasky's  re-quests for a stay of the return order pending appeal.  907 F. 3d, at 407.  In December 2016, A. M. T., nearly two yearsold, was returned to Italy and placed in her father's care.1 In  the  United  States,  Monasky's  appeal  of  the  District  Court's return order proceeded.  See Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U. S. 165, 180 (2013) (the return of a child under the Hague Convention does not moot an appeal of the return order).  A divided three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed theDistrict Court's order, and a divided en banc court adhered to that disposition.The en banc majority noted first that, after the District Court's  decision,  a  precedential  Sixth  Circuit  opinion,  Ah-med  v.  Ahmed,  867  F.  3d  682  (2017),  established  that,  asthe District Court had assumed, an infant's habitual resi-dence  depends  on  "shared  parental  intent."    907  F.  3d,  at  —————— 1Taglieri represents that "[a]n order issued by the Italian court in De-cember  2018  awarded  legal  custody  of  A.  M.  T.,  on  an  interim  basis,  to  the Lugo municipality . . . with placement at [Taglieri's] residence; and provided that mother-daughter visits would continue under the plan pre-scribed in a court order issued earlier in 2018."  Brief for Respondent 56, n. 13. 
7 Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) Opinion of the Court appellate review.  Compare, e.g., 907 F. 3d, at 408–409 (case below)  (clear  error),  with,  e.g., Mozes,  239  F.  3d,  at  1073  (de novo). II The  first  question  presented  concerns  the  standard  forhabitual  residence:  Is  an  actual  agreement  between  theparents on where to raise their child categorically necessaryto  establish  an  infant's  habitual  residence?    We  hold  that  the  determination  of  habitual  residence  does  not  turn  on  the existence of an actual agreement. A We begin with "the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are used." Air France v. Saks, 470 U. S. 392, 397 (1985).  The Hague Convention does not de-fine the term "habitual residence."  A child "resides" where she lives.  See Black's Law Dictionary 1176 (5th ed. 1979).Her  residence  in  a  particular  country  can  be  deemed  "ha-bitual,"  however,  only  when  her  residence  there  is  morethan transitory.  "Habitual" implies "[c]ustomary, usual, ofthe nature of a habit."  Id., at 640.  The Hague Convention's text alone does not definitively tell us what makes a child's residence sufficiently enduring to be deemed "habitual."  It surely does not say that habitual residence depends on anactual agreement between a child's parents.  But the term "habitual" does suggest a fact-sensitive inquiry, not a cate-gorical one.The  Convention's  explanatory  report  confirms  what  theConvention's text suggests.  The report informs that habit-ual  residence  is  a  concept  "well-established  .  .  .  in  the  Hague Conference."  1980 Conférence de La Haye de droit international  privé,  Enlèvement  d'enfants,  E.  Pérez-Vera,  
8                                     MONASKY                                     v. TAGLIERI Opinion of the Court Explanatory  Report  in  3  Actes  et  documents  de  la  Qua-torzième session, p. 445, ¶66 (1982) (Pérez-Vera).2  The re-port  refers  to  a  child's  habitual  residence  in  fact-focused  terms:  "the  family  and  social  environment  in  which  [the  child's] life has developed." Id., at 428, ¶11.  What makes a child's residence "habitual" is therefore "some degree of in-tegration by the child in a social and family environment." OL v. PQ, 2017 E. C. R. No. C–111/17, ¶42 (Judgt. of June8); accord Office of the Children's Lawyer v. Balev, [2018] 1S.  C.  R.  398,  421,  ¶43,  424  D.  L.  R.  (4th)  391,  410,  ¶43  (Can.); A v. A, [2014] A. C., ¶54 (2013) (U. K.).  Accordingly,while  Federal  Courts  of  Appeals  have  diverged,  if  only  inemphasis, in the standards they use to locate a child's ha-bitual  residence,  see  supra,  at  6,  they  share  a  "common"understanding: The place where a child is at home, at the time of removal or retention, ranks as the child's habitual residence.  Karkkainen  v.  Kovalchuk,  445  F.  3d  280,  291  (CA3 2006).Because locating a child's home is a fact-driven inquiry,courts must be "sensitive to the unique circumstances of the case and informed by common sense." Redmond, 724 F. 3d, at  744.   For  older  children  capable  of  acclimating  to  their  surroundings, courts have long recognized, facts indicating —————— 2According to an analysis provided by the Department of State to theSenate during the ratification process, the "explanatory report is recog-nized by the [Hague] Conference as the official history and commentary on the Convention and is a source of background on the meaning of theprovisions  of  the  Convention."    Hague  International  Child  Abduction  Convention;  Text  and  Legal  Analysis,  51  Fed.  Reg.  10503  (1986).    The  explanatory report notes, however, that "it has not been approved by theConference, and it is possible that, despite the Rapporter's [sic] efforts toremain  objective,  certain  passages  reflect  a  viewpoint  which  is  in  part  subjective."  Pérez-Vera 427–428, ¶8.  See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U. S. 1, 19  (2010)  ("We  need  not  decide  whether  this  Report  should  be  given  greater weight than a scholarly commentary."). 
9 Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) Opinion of the Court acclimatization will be highly relevant.3  Because children, especially those too young or otherwise unable to acclimate, depend  on  their  parents  as  caregivers,  the  intentions  andcircumstances of caregiving parents are relevant consider-ations.    No  single  fact,  however,  is  dispositive  across  all  cases.    Common  sense  suggests  that  some  cases  will  be  straightforward: Where a child has lived in one place with her family indefinitely, that place is likely to be her habit-ual  residence.    But  suppose,  for  instance,  that  an  infantlived  in  a  country  only  because  a  caregiving  parent  had  been  coerced  into  remaining  there.    Those  circumstances  should  figure  in  the  calculus.   See  Karkkainen,  445  F.  3d,  at  291  ("The  inquiry  into  a  child's  habitual  residence  is  afact-intensive  determination  that  cannot  be  reduced  to  a predetermined formula and necessarily varies with the cir-cumstances of each case.").The  treaty's  "negotiation  and  drafting  history"  corrobo-rates that a child's habitual residence depends on the spe-cific  circumstances  of  the  particular  case.    Medellín  v.  Texas, 552 U. S. 491, 507 (2008) (noting that such history may aid treaty interpretation).  The Convention's explana-tory report states that the Hague Conference regarded ha-bitual residence as "a question of pure fact, differing in thatrespect from domicile."  Pérez-Vera 445, ¶66.  The Confer-ence deliberately chose "habitual residence" for its factual character, making it the foundation for the Convention's re-turn  remedy  in  lieu  of  formal  legal  concepts  like  domicile  —————— 3Facts  courts  have  considered  include:  "a  change  in  geography  com-bined  with  the  passage  of  an  appreciable  period  of  time,"  "age  of  the  child,"  "immigration  status  of  child  and  parent,"  "academic  activities,"  "social engagements," "participation in sports programs and excursions," "meaningful  connections  with  the  people  and  places  in  the  child's  new  country,"  "language  proficiency,"  and  "location  of  personal  belongings."  Federal  Judicial  Center,  J.  Garbolino,  The  1980  Hague  Convention  on  the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: A Guide for Judges 67–68 (2d ed. 2015). 
10                                   MONASKY                                   v. TAGLIERI Opinion of the Court and nationality.  See Anton, The Hague Convention on In-ternational  Child  Abduction,  30  Int'l  &  Comp.  L.  Q.  537,544 (1981) (history of the Convention authored by the draft-ing  commission's  chairman).    That  choice  is  instructive.  The signatory nations sought to afford courts charged withdetermining  a  child's  habitual  residence  "maximum  flex-ibility"  to  respond  to  the  particular  circumstances  of  each  case.  P. Beaumont & P. McEleavy, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction 89–90 (1999) (Beaumont &  McEleavy).   The  aim:  to  ensure  that  custody  is  adjudi-cated  in  what  is  presumptively  the  most  appropriate  fo-rum—the country where the child is at home. Our conclusion that a child's habitual residence dependson the particular circumstances of each case is bolstered bythe  views  of  our  treaty  partners.   ICARA  expressly  recog-nizes "the need for uniform international interpretation ofthe  Convention."   22  U.  S.  C.  §9001(b)(3)(B).    See  Lozano, 572 U. S., at 13; Abbott, 560 U. S., at 16.  The understand-ing that the opinions of our sister signatories to a treaty are due "considerable weight," this Court has said, has "specialforce" in Hague Convention cases. Ibid. (quoting El Al Is-rael  Airlines,  Ltd.  v. Tsui  Yuan  Tseng,  525  U.  S.  155,  176  (1999), in turn quoting Air France, 470 U. S., at 404).  The "clear trend" among our treaty partners is to treat the de-termination  of  habitual  residence  as  a  fact-driven  inquiryinto the particular circumstances of the case.  Balev, [2018] 1 S. C. R., at 423, ¶50, 424 D. L. R. (4th), at 411, ¶50. Lady  Hale  wrote  for  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  Kingdom: A child's habitual residence "depends on numer-ous factors . . . with the purposes and intentions of the par-ents being merely one of the relevant factors. . . . The essen-tially  factual  and  individual  nature  of  the  inquiry  should  not be glossed with legal concepts." A, [2014] A. C., at ¶54.  The Court of Justice of the European Union, the Supreme Court  of  Canada,  and  the  High  Court  of  Australia  agree.  
11 Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) Opinion of the Court See OL, 2017 E. C. R. No. C–111/17, ¶42 (the habitual res-idence of a child "must be established . . . taking account ofall  the  circumstances  of  fact  specific  to  each  individual  case"); Balev, [2018] 1 S. C. R., at 421, 423–430, ¶¶43, 48–71, 424 D. L. R. (4th), at 410–417, ¶¶43, 48–71 (adopting an approach  to  habitual  residence  under  which  "[t]he  judgeconsiders  all  relevant  links  and  circumstances");  LK  v.  Director-General,  Dept.  of  Community  Servs.,  [2009]  237C. L. R. 582, 596, ¶35 (Austl.) ("to seek to identify a set listof criteria that bear upon where a child is habitually resi-dent . . . would deny the simple observation that the ques-tion of habitual residence will fall for decision in a very widerange of circumstances").  Intermediate appellate courts inHong  Kong  and  New  Zealand  have  similarly  stated  what  "habitual  residence"  imports.   See  LCYP  v.  JEK,  [2015]  4H. K. L. R. D.  798,  809–810,  ¶7.7  (H. K.); Punter  v.  Secre-tary  for  Justice,  [2007]  1  N.  Z.  L.  R.  40,  71,  ¶130  (N.  Z.).  Tellingly, Monasky has not identified a single treaty part-ner  that  has  adopted  her  actual-agreement  proposal.   See  Tr. of Oral Arg. 9.4 The  bottom  line:  There  are  no  categorical  requirementsfor establishing a child's habitual residence—least of all anactual-agreement requirement for infants.  Monasky's pro-—————— 4Monasky   disputes   that   foreign   courts   apply   a   totality-of-the-   circumstances standard to infants, as opposed to older children.  In this regard,  she  points  out,  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  in-structs that, "where 'the infant is in fact looked after by her mother,' 'it is necessary to assess the mother's integration in her social and familyenvironment' in the relevant country."  Reply Brief 5–6 (quoting Mercredi v. Chaffe, 2010 E. C. R. I–14309, I–14379, ¶55).  True, a caregiving par-ent's ties to the country at issue are highly relevant.  But the Court of Justice did not hold that the caregiver's ties are the end of the inquiry. Rather, the deciding court must "tak[e] account of all the circumstances of fact specific to each individual case." Id., ¶56 (emphasis added) (alsoconsidering, among other factors, the infant's physical presence and du-ration of time in the country). 
12                                   MONASKY                                   v. TAGLIERI Opinion of the Court posed  actual-agreement  requirement  is  not  only  unsup-ported  by  the  Convention's  text  and  inconsistent  with  the  leeway  and  international  harmony  the  Conventiondemands;  her  proposal  would  thwart  the  Convention's  "objects and purposes."  Abbott, 560 U. S., at 20.  An actual-agreement  requirement  would  enable  a  parent,  by  with-holding agreement, unilaterally to block any finding of ha-bitual residence for an infant.  If adopted, the requirementwould  undermine  the  Convention's  aim  to  stop  unilateraldecisions  to  remove  children  across  international  borders.  Moreover, when parents' relations are acrimonious, as is of-ten the case in controversies arising under the Convention, agreement can hardly be expected.  In short, as the Court of Appeals observed below, "Monasky's approach would cre-ate a presumption of no habitual residence for infants, leav-ing  the  population  most  vulnerable  to  abduction  the  leastprotected."  907 F. 3d, at 410. B Monasky counters that an actual-agreement requirement is necessary to ensure "that an infant's mere physical pres-ence  in  a  country  has  a  sufficiently  settled  quality  to  bedeemed  'habitual.'"    Brief  for  Petitioner  32.    An  infant's  "mere physical presence," we agree, is not a dispositive in-dicator of an infant's habitual residence.  But a wide rangeof facts other than an actual agreement, including facts in-dicating that the parents have made their home in a partic-ular place, can enable a trier to determine whether an in-fant's  residence  in  that  place  has  the  quality  of  being  "habitual." Monasky also argues that a bright-line rule like her pro-posed    actual-agreement    requirement    would    promoteprompt returns of abducted children and deter would-be ab-ductors from "tak[ing] their chances" in the first place. Id., at 35, 38.  Adjudicating a winner-takes-all evidentiary dis-pute  over  whether  an  agreement  existed,  however,  is  
13 Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) Opinion of the Court scarcely  more  expeditious  than  providing  courts  with  lee-way  to  make  "a  quick  impression  gained  on  a  panoramic  view of the evidence."  Beaumont & McEleavy 103 (internalquotation marks omitted).  When all the circumstances are in  play,  would-be  abductors  should  find  it  more,  not  less,difficult to manipulate the reality on the ground, thus im-peding them from forging "artificial jurisdictional links . . . with  a  view  to  obtaining  custody  of  a  child."   Pérez-Vera  428, ¶11.Finally,  Monasky  and  amici  curiae  raise  a  troublesome  matter: An actual-agreement requirement, they say, is nec-essary to protect children born into domestic violence.  Brief for Petitioner 42–44; Brief for Sanctuary for Families et al. as Amici Curiae 11–20.  Domestic violence poses an "intrac-table" problem in Hague Convention cases involving care-giving parents fleeing with their children from abuse.  Hale, Taking Flight—Domestic Violence and Child Abduction, 70 Current Legal Prob. 3, 11 (2017).  We doubt, however, that imposing a categorical actual-agreement requirement is anappropriate solution, for it would leave many infants with-out a habitual residence, and therefore outside the Conven-tion's domain.  See supra, at 11–12.  Settling the forum foradjudication  of  a  dispute  over  a  child's  custody,  of  course,does not dispose of the merits of the controversy over cus-tody.  Domestic violence should be an issue fully explored in the custody adjudication upon the child's return.The  Hague  Convention,  we  add,  has  a  mechanism  for  guarding  children  from  the  harms  of  domestic  violence:  Article 13(b).  See Hale, 70 Current Legal Prob.,  at 10–16 (on  Hague  Conference  working  group  to  develop  a  best-  practices guide to the interpretation and application of Article 13(b) in cases involving domestic violence).  Article 13(b), as noted supra, at 3, allows a court to refrain from ordering a child's return to her habitual residence if "there is a grave risk that [the child's] return would expose the child to phys-ical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an 
14                                   MONASKY                                   v. TAGLIERI Opinion of the Court intolerable  situation."    Art.  13(b),  Treaty  Doc.,  at  10.Monasky raised below an Article 13(b) defense to Taglieri'sreturn  petition.    In  response,  the  District  Court  creditedMonasky's "deeply troubl[ing]" allegations of her exposure to Taglieri's physical abuse.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 105a.  But the  District  Court  found  "no  evidence"  that  Taglieri  ever  abused  A.  M.  T.  or  otherwise  disregarded  her  well-being.  Id., at 103a, 105a.  That court also followed Circuit prece-dent   disallowing   consideration   of   psychological   harm   A.  M.  T.  might  experience  due  to  separation  from  her  mother.  Id.,  at  102a.    Monasky  does  not  challenge  thosedispositions in this Court. III Turning  to  the  second  question  presented:  What  is  the  appropriate standard of appellate review of an initial adju-dicator's  habitual-residence  determination?    Neither  the  Convention  nor  ICARA  prescribes  modes  of  appellate  re-view,  other  than  the  directive  to  act  "expeditiously."    Art. 11, Treaty Doc., at 9; see Federal Judicial Center, J. Gar-bolino, The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: A Guide for Judges 162 (2d ed.  2015)  (the  Convention's  "emphasis  on  prompt  disposi-tion applies to appellate proceedings").5 Absent a treaty or statutory prescription, the appropriatelevel of deference to a trial court's habitual-residence deter-mination depends on whether that determination resolves a question of law, a question of fact, or a mixed question of law  and  fact.    Generally,  questions  of  law  are  reviewed  —————— 5Monasky contends that only de novo review can satisfy "the need for uniform  international  interpretation  of  the  Convention."  22  U.  S.  C.  §9001(b)(3)(B).  See Brief for Petitioner 19–21.  However, ICARA's recog-nition of the need for harmonious international interpretation is hardly akin  to  the  "clear  statutory  prescription"  on  the  standard  of  appellate  review that Congress has provided "[f]or some few trial court determina-tions." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 558 (1988)
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) Opinion of the Court de novo and questions of fact, for clear error, while the ap-propriate standard of appellate review for a mixed question"depends . . . on whether answering it entails primarily le-gal  or  factual  work."  U.  S.  Bank  N.  A.  v.  Village  at  Lak-eridge, LLC, 583 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 8–9). A  child's  habitual  residence  presents  what  U.  S.  law  types a "mixed question" of law and fact—albeit barely so. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 7).  The inquiry begins with a legal question: What is the appropriate standard for habitual res-idence?  Once the trial court correctly identifies the govern-ing  totality-of-the-circumstances  standard,  however,  what  remains for the court to do in applying that standard, as we explained supra,  at  7–11,  is  to  answer  a  factual  question:Was  the  child  at  home  in  the  particular  country  at  issue?  The habitual-residence determination thus presents a task for  factfinding  courts,  not  appellate  courts,  and  should  be  judged on appeal by a clear-error review standard deferen-tial to the factfinding court. In selecting standards of appellate review, the Court hasalso  asked  whether  there  is  "a  long  history  of  appellate  practice" indicating the appropriate standard, for arriving at  the  standard  from  first  principles  can  prove  "uncom-monly  difficult."  Pierce  v.  Underwood,  487  U.  S.  552,  558  (1988).  Although some Federal Courts of Appeals have re-viewed  habitual-residence  determinations  de novo,  there  has been no uniform, reasoned practice in this regard, noth-ing  resembling  "a  historical  tradition."    Ibid.  See  also  supra,  at  6–7  (noting  a  Circuit  split).    Moreover,  when  a  mixed question has a factual foundation as evident as thehabitual-residence  inquiry  here  does,  there  is  scant  cause  to default to historical practice.Clear-error review has a particular virtue in Hague Con-vention  cases.   As  a  deferential  standard  of  review,  clear-error review speeds up appeals and thus serves the Conven-tion's premium on expedition.  See Arts. 2, 11, Treaty Doc., at 7, 9.  Notably, courts of our treaty partners review first-
16                                   MONASKY                                   v. TAGLIERI Opinion of the Court instance  habitual-residence  determinations  deferentially.See, e.g., Balev, [2018] 1 S. C. R., at 419, ¶38, 424 D. L. R.(4th), at 408, ¶38; Punter, [2007] 1 N. Z. L. R., at 88, ¶204; AR v. RN, [2015] UKSC 35, ¶18. IV Although agreeing with the manner in which the Courthas  resolved  the  two  questions  presented,  the  UnitedStates, as an amicus curiae supporting neither party, sug-gests remanding to the Court of Appeals rather than affirm-ing that court's judgment.  Brief for United States as Ami-cus  Curiae  28.    Ordinarily,  we  might  take  that  course,  giving  the  lower  courts  an  opportunity  to  apply  the  gov-erning  totality-of-the-circumstances  standard  in  the  first  instance. Under the circumstances of this case, however, we decline to  disturb  the  judgment  below.    True,  the  lower  courts  viewed A. M. T.'s situation through the lens of her parents' shared  intentions.    But,  after  a  four-day  bench  trial,  theDistrict Court had before it all the facts relevant to the dis-pute.  Asked at oral argument to identify any additional fact the  District  Court  did  not  digest,  counsel  for  the  UnitedStates offered none.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 38.  Monasky and Ta-glieri agree that their dispute "requires no 'further factual development,'" and neither party asks for a remand.  Reply Brief 22 (quoting Brief for Respondent 54).Monasky  does  urge  the  Court  to  reverse  if  it  rests  A. M. T.'s habitual residence on all relevant circumstances. She points to her "absence of settled ties to Italy" and the "unsettled  and  unstable  conditions  in  which  A.  M.  T.  re-sided  in  Italy."    Reply  Brief  19  (internal  quotation  marks  and alteration omitted).  The District Court considered the competing  facts  bearing  on  those  assertions,  however,  in-cluding  the  fraught  circumstances  in  which  the  parties'  marriage  unraveled.    That  court  nevertheless  found  that  Monasky had sufficient ties to Italy such that "[a]rguably, 
17 Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) Opinion of the Court [she] was a habitual resident of Italy."  App. to Pet. for Cert. 91a.  And, despite the rocky state of the marriage, the Dis-trict  Court  found  beyond  question  that  A.  M.  T.  was  borninto "a marital home in Italy," one that her parents estab-lished  "with  no  definitive  plan  to  return  to  the  United  States."  Id.,  at  97a.   Nothing  in  the  record  suggests  that  the  District  Court  would  appraise  the  facts  differently  on  remand. A remand would consume time when swift resolution is the  Convention's  objective.   The  instant  return-order  pro-ceedings began a few months after A. M. T.'s birth.  She is now five years old.  The more than four-and-a-half-year du-ration of this litigation dwarfs the six-week target time forresolving a return-order petition.  See Art. 11, Treaty Doc., at 9.  Taglieri represents that custody of A. M. T. has so far been resolved only "on an interim basis," Brief for Respond-ent  56,  n.  13,  and  that  custody  proceedings,  including  thematter of Monasky's parental rights, remain pending in It-aly.   Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  60–61.    Given  the  exhaustive  record  before the District Court, the absence of any reason to an-ticipate that the District Court's judgment would change on a remand that neither party seeks, and the protraction of proceedings thus far, final judgment on A. M. T.'s return isin order. *        *        *    For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Ap-peals for the Sixth Circuit is Affirmed. 
_________________ _________________ 1 Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) Opinion of THOMAS, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 18–935 MICHELLE MONASKY, PETITIONER v. DOMENICO TAGLIERI ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT [February 25, 2020] JUSTICE THOMAS,  concurring  in  part  and  concurring  inthe judgment. The Court correctly concludes that an actual agreement between parents is not necessary to establish the habitual residence of an infant who is too young to acclimatize.*  I also  agree  with  the  Court's  conclusion  that  the  habitual-residence inquiry is intensely fact driven, requiring courts to take account of the unique circumstances of each case.  I write separately, however, because I would decide this case principally on the plain meaning of the treaty's text. I This case requires us to interpret the Hague Conventionon the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct.25, 1980, T. I. A. S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–11, as implemented by the International Child Abduction Reme-dies Act (ICARA), as amended, 22 U. S. C. §9001 et seq.  Ar-ticle 3 of the Convention provides that the "removal or theretention of a child is to be considered wrongful" when "it is —————— * The Court states that we "granted certiorari to clarify the standard for habitual residence," ante, at 6, and the opinion contains language that may  be  read  to  apply  to  older  children,  see,  e.g., ante,  at  8–9.    But  the  relevant question presented focuses exclusively on the habitual residence of "an infant [who] is too young to acclimate to her surroundings."  Pet. for Cert. i.  I would confine our analysis to that distinct question, whichis the only one briefed by the parties. 
2                                     MONASKY                                     v. TAGLIERI Opinion of THOMAS, J. in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person . . . un-der the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention" and "at the time of removal or retention those rights were actu-ally  exercised."    S.  Treaty  Doc.  No.  99–11,  at  7.    Under  ICARA, a parent may petition a federal or state court to re-turn an abducted child to the child's country of habitual res-idence.    §9003(b).    ICARA  does  not  define  habitual  resi-dence;  it  merely  states  that  the  petitioning  parent  must"establish by a preponderance of the evidence . . . that the child has been wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning of the Convention."  §9003(e)(1)(A).  The Conven-tion also does not define the phrase." 'The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation ofa statute, begins with its text.'" Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U. S. 1, 10 (2010) (quoting Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S. 491, 506 (2008)).    The  Court  recognizes  this  fact,  but  it  concludes  that  the  text  only  "suggests"  that  habitual  residence  is  a  fact-driven   inquiry,   and   ultimately   relies   on   atextual   sources to "confir[m] what the Convention's text suggests." Ante, at 7.  In my view, the ordinary meaning of the relevantlanguage  at  the  time  of  the  treaty's  enactment  providesstrong  evidence  that  the  habitual-residence  inquiry  is  in-herently  fact  driven.    See  Schindler  Elevator  Corp.  v.  United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U. S. 401, 407 (2011). In 1980, as today, "habitual" referred to something that was "[c]ustomary" or "usual."  Black's Law Dictionary 640 (5th ed. 1979); see also 6 Oxford English Dictionary 996 (2d ed. 1989) ("existing as a settled practice or condition; con-stantly   repeated   or   continued;   customary");   Webster's   Third New International Dictionary 1017 (1976) (similar). And "residence" referred to a "[p]ersonal presence at someplace  of  abode,"  Black's  Law  Dictionary,  at  1176,  "one'susual  dwelling-place,"  13  Oxford  English  Dictionary,  at707, or "the act or fact of abiding or dwelling in a place for some time," Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 
3 Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) Opinion of THOMAS, J. at 1931; see also ibid. ("a temporary or permanent dwelling place, abode, or habitation"). These definitions demonstrate that the concept of habit-ual residence for a child too young to acclimatize cannot bereduced to a neat set of necessary and sufficient conditions.Answering the question of what is customary or usual, for instance, requires judges to consider a host of facts, such as the  presence  or  absence  of  bank  accounts  and  driver's  li-censes,   the   length   and   type   of   employment,   and   thestrength and duration of other community ties.  Determin-ing whether there is a residence involves the consideration of factors such as the presence or absence of a permanenthome,  the  duration  in  the  country  at  issue,  and,  in  somecases, an actual agreement between the parents to reside ina  particular  place.   Accordingly,  the  ordinary  meaning  ofthe phrase "habitual residence" provides strong support for the  conclusion  that  an  objective  agreement  between  thechild's parents is not required.  This plain meaning should serve as the primary guide for our interpretation.  See Wa-ter Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 4); Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U. S. 644, 649 (2004). II This case exemplifies the wisdom of firmly anchoring our discussion in the text before turning to the decisions of sis-ter  signatories—especially  when  those  decisions  are  not  contemporaneous  with  the  treaty's  passage.    Here,  the  Court  finds  it  meaningful  that  foreign  courts  have  inter-preted the phrase "habitual residence" as a fact-driven in-quiry.  Ante,  at  10–11.   Though  a  "'clear  trend'"  has  cer-tainly emerged in foreign courts, ante, at 10, this consensus appears to have developed only within the past decade.Lady Hale of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom noted as much in the 2013 decision cited by the Court.  As she  explained,  for  many  years  "the  English  courts  [had]  
4                                     MONASKY                                     v. TAGLIERI Opinion of THOMAS, J. been tempted to overlay the factual concept of habitual res-idence with legal constructs," creating legal rules that dic-tated a child's habitual residence. A v. A, [2014] A. C. ¶39 (2013) (U. K.); see also id., ¶37.  According to one commen-tator  writing  in  2001,  though  "academics  and  judges"  had  stressed "that the term should not be treated as a term of art  and  should  not  be  complicated  by  technical  legal  re-quirements  similar  to  those  applicable  to  the  concept  of  domicile," "in some cases these statements seem[ed] to havebeen  pure  lip-service,  since  many  courts  [were]  unable  to  resist the temptation to 'legalise' the concept."  Schuz, Ha-bitual  Residence  of  Children  Under  the  Hague  Child  Ab-duction Convention—Theory and Practice, 13 Child & Fam-ily L. Q. 1, 4 (2001).  Thus, until recently, "[t]he approach ofmany [foreign] courts [had] been to focus exclusively on the purpose  of  the  parents  in  relocating,"  an  inquiry  that  speaks to the legal concept of domicile.  Schuz, Policy Con-siderations  in  Determining  the  Habitual  Residence  of  aChild and the Relevance Of Context, 11 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 101, 103 (2001) (footnote omitted).It seems, then, that it took approximately 30 years from the time of the Convention's enactment in 1980 for foreignjurisdictions to coalesce around an interpretation of habit-ual residence.  This relatively recent evolution brings intobold relief the risk of relying too heavily on the decisions of foreign courts in lieu of a fulsome textual analysis.  Because the  decisions  are  not  contemporaneous  with  the  treaty'spassage, they do not necessarily provide the best evidenceof the original understanding of the phrase.  And reflexivelylooking  to  foreign  courts  raises  the  question  whether  thisCourt would have resolved this case differently had the is-sue been presented in 1990, 2000, or even 2010, before the clear trend emerged. The Court attempts to sidestep this difficulty by pointing to a statement in ICARA's preamble that stresses "the needfor uniform international interpretation of the Convention." 
5 Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) Opinion of THOMAS, J. 22 U. S. C. §9001(b)(3)(B); see ante, at 10.  It should go with-out saying that if our independent assessment of habitualresidence led to a conclusion that diverged from the emerg-ing consensus, invocation of this prefatory language to forceagreement  at  the  expense  of  plain  meaning  would  be  un-founded.  By relying too heavily on the judicial decisions of the treaty's other signatories, rather than on a more thor-ough textual analysis, we risk being persuaded to reach the popular answer, but perhaps not the correct one.  In short, "we should not substitute the judgment of other courts forour own." Abbott, 560 U. S., at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Olympic Airways, 540 U. S., at 655, n. 9. To avoid these potential pitfalls, I would rely on the plain meaning of "habitual residence" to conclude that an actual agreement is not necessary.  See supra, at 2–3.  That con-clusion is bolstered by the Convention's explanatory report.Interpretations from the courts of sister signatories, thoughrecent, also support the conclusion because they align withthe meaning of the text and our own independent judgment.Because the Court places insufficient weight on the treaty'stext, I cannot join Part II of its opinion. 
_________________ _________________ 1 Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2019) Opinion of ALITO, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 18–935 MICHELLE MONASKY, PETITIONER v. DOMENICO TAGLIERI ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT [February 25, 2020] JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment. I  agree  with  the  Court  on  almost  all  the  issues  in  this  case.  Specifically, I agree (1) that analysis of the question of "habitual residence" should be based on a range of factorsand should be attentive to the particular facts of each case, (2) that a child may have a habitual residence in a countrywithout a parental agreement to that effect, (3) that our in-terpretation of habitual residence should take into account the interpretations of other signatory nations, (4) that a dis-trict court's decision on habitual residence is entitled to def-erence on appeal, and (5) that the judgment below should be  affirmed.    I  also  agree  with  JUSTICE THOMAS  that  we  must  independently  interpret  the  meaning  of  "habitualresidence." So  what  does  it  mean?    The  term  "habitual"  is  used  to  refer to a cluster of related concepts.  It can be used to refer to  things  done  by  habit,  as  well  as  things  that  are  "con-stantly repeated or continued," "usual," or "accustomed."  6 Oxford English Dictionary 996 (2d ed. 1989); see also Web-ster's Third New International Dictionary 1017 (1976).  If taken in isolation, each of these understandings might leadto a different analysis in applying the concept of "habitual residence"  under  the  Convention.   See  Hague  Convention  on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 
2                                     MONASKY                                     v. TAGLIERI Opinion of ALITO, J. 25,  1980,  T.  I.  A.  S.  No.  11670,  S.  Treaty  Doc.  No.  99–11.But  I  think  the  Court  accurately  captures  what  the  termmeans under the Convention when it says that a child's ha-bitual residence is the child's "home."  Ante, at 8, 10, 15. Of course the concept of "home" is also multifaceted.  It can  be  used  to  signify  the  place  where  a  person  generally  sleeps, eats, works, and engages in social and recreational activities,  but  it  can  also  mean  the  place  where  a  person  feels  most  comfortable  and  the  place  to  which  the  personhas the strongest emotional ties.  See 7 Oxford English Dic-tionary,  at  322–323;  Webster's  Third  New  International  Dictionary, at 1082.  As best I can determine, the concept of "habitual residence" under the Convention embraces all of these meanings to some degree. If forced to try to synthe-size them, I would say it means the place where the child in fact  has  been  living  for  an  extended  period—unless  that  place was never regarded as more than temporary or there is another place to which the child has a strong attachment.I think this is the core of what courts have made of the con-cept of "habitual residence," and it appears to represent thebest  distillation  of  the  various  shades  of  meaning  of  the  term taken in context. So  interpreted,  "habitual  residence"  is  not  a  pure  ques-tion of fact, at least as we understand that concept in our legal system.  But it does involve a heavily factual inquiry.For these reasons, I would say that the standard of review on appeal is abuse of discretion, not clear error.  As a prac-tical matter, the difference may be no more than minimal. The  important  point  is  that  great  deference  should  be  af-forded to the District Court's determination.