Sentenza

UNITED STATES v . WINDSOR, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF SPYER

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

UNITED STATES v . WINDSOR, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF SPYER, ET AL . CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 12–307. Argued March 27, 2013—Decided June 26, 2013
The State of New York recognizes
the marriage of New York residents
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer, wh
o wed in Ontario, Canada, in
2007. When Spyer died in 2009, she left her entire estate to Windsor.
Windsor sought to claim the federal estate tax exemption for surviv
-
ing spouses, but was barred from doing so by §3 of the federal De
-
fense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which amended the Dictionary Act—a
law providing rules of construction for over 1,000 federal laws and
the whole realm of federal regulations—to define “marriage” and
“spouse” as excluding same-sex partners. Windsor paid $363,053 in
estate taxes and sought a refund, which the Internal Revenue Service
denied. Windsor brought this refund suit, contending that DOMA vi
-
olates the principles of equal prot
ection incorporated in the Fifth
Amendment. While the
suit was pending, the Attorney General noti
-
fied the Speaker of the House of
Representatives that the Depart
-
ment of Justice would no longer defend §3's constitutionality. In re
-
sponse, the Bipartisan Legal Adviso
ry Group (BLAG) of the House of
Representatives voted to intervene
in the litigation to defend §3's
constitutionality. The District Co
urt permitted the intervention. On
the merits, the court ruled against
the United States, finding §3 un
-
constitutional and ordering the Treasury to refund Windsor's tax
with interest. The Second Circuit
affirmed. The United States has
not complied with the judgment.
Held
:
1.
This Court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case.
This case clearly presented a co
ncrete disagreement between oppos
-
ing parties that was suitable for ju
dicial resolution in the District
Court, but the Executive'
s decision not to defend §3's constitutionali
-
2
UNITED
STATES
v.
WINDSOR
Syllabus
ty in court while continuing to de
ny refunds and assess deficiencies
introduces a complication. Give
n the Government's concession,
ami
-
cus
contends, once the District Court ordered the refund, the case
should have ended and the appeal
been dismissed. But this argu
-
ment elides the distinction between
Article III's jurisdictional re
-
quirements and the prudential limi
ts on its exercise, which are “es
-
sentially matters of judi
cial self-governance.”
Warth
v.
Seldin
, 422
U.
S. 490, 500. Here, the United States retains a stake sufficient to
support Article III jurisdiction on a
ppeal and in this Court. The re
-
fund it was ordered to pay Windsor
is “a real and immediate econom
-
ic injury,”
Hein
v.
Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc.
, 551 U. S.
587, 599, even if the Executive disagrees with §3 of DOMA. Wind
-
sor's ongoing claim for funds that the United States refuses to pay
thus establishes a controversy sufficient for Article III jurisdiction.
Cf.
INS
v.
Chadha
, 462 U. S. 919.
Prudential considerations, howeve
r, demand that there be “con
-
crete adverseness which sharpens th
e presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends fo
r illumination of difficult consti
-
tutional questions.”
Baker
v.
Carr
, 369 U. S. 186, 204. Unlike Article
III requirements—which mu
st be satisfied by the parties before judi
-
cial consideration is appropriate—prudential factors that counsel
against hearing this case are su
bject to “countervailing considera
-
tions [that] may outweigh the conc
erns underlying the usual reluc
-
tance to exert judicial power.”
Warth
,
supra,
at 500–501. One such
consideration is the extent to whic
h adversarial presentation of the
issues is ensured by the participation of
amici curiae
prepared to de
-
fend with vigor the legislative act's constitutionality. See
Chadha,
supra,
at 940. Here, BLAG's substantial adversarial argument for
§3's constitutionality satisfies prudential concerns that otherwise
might counsel against hearing an appeal from a decision with which
the principal parties agree. This co
nclusion does not mean that it is
appropriate for the Executive as a ro
utine exercise to challenge stat
-
utes in court instead of making
the case to Congress for amendment
or repeal. But this case is not routine, and BLAG's capable defense
ensures that the prudenti
al issues do not cloud the merits question,
which is of immediate importance to the Federal Government and to
hundreds of thousands of persons. Pp. 5–13.
2.
DOMA is unconstitutional as a de
privation of the equal liberty of
persons that is protected by th
e Fifth Amendment. Pp. 13–26.
(a)
By history and tradition the
definition and regulation of mar
-
riage has been treated as being with
in the authority and realm of the
separate States. Congress has enacted discrete statutes to regulate
the meaning of marriage in order to further federal policy, but
DOMA, with a directive applicable to over 1,000 federal statutes and
3
Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)
Syllabus
the whole realm of federal regulations, has a far greater reach. Its
operation is also directed to a cla
ss of persons that the laws of New
York, and of 11 other States, have so
ught to protect. Assessing the
validity of that intervention requir
es discussing the historical and
traditional extent of state powe
r and authority over marriage.
Subject to certain constitutional guarantees, see
, e.g., Loving
v.
Virginia
, 388 U. S. 1, “regulation of domestic relations” is “an area
that has long been regarded as a
virtually exclusive province of the
States,”
Sosna
v.
Iowa
, 419 U. S. 393, 404. The significance of state
responsibilities for the definition
and regulation of marriage dates to
the Nation's beginning; for “when the Constitution was adopted the
common understanding was that the domestic relations of husband
and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States,”
Ohio ex rel. Popovici
v.
Agler
, 280 U. S. 379, 383–384. Marriage laws
may vary from State to State, but they are consistent within each
State.
DOMA rejects this long-established
precept. The State's decision
to give this class of persons the right to marry conferred upon them a
dignity and status of immense import. But the Federal Government
uses the state-defined class for th
e opposite purpose—to impose re
-
strictions and disabilities. The qu
estion is whether the resulting in
-
jury and indignity is a deprivation of an essential part of the liberty
protected by the Fifth Amendment,
since what New York treats as
alike the federal law deems unlike by
a law designed to injure the
same class the State seeks to prot
ect. New York's actions were a
proper exercise of its sovereign au
thority. They reflect both the
community's considered perspective on
the historical roots of the in
-
stitution of marriage and its evolvi
ng understanding of the meaning
of equality. Pp. 13–20.
(b)
By seeking to injure the very
class New York seeks to protect,
DOMA violates basic due process and
equal protection principles ap
-
plicable to the Federal Government.
The Constitution's guarantee of
equality “must at the very least mean that a bare congressional de
-
sire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot” justify disparate
treatment of that group.
Department of Agriculture
v.
Moreno
, 413
U.
S. 528, 534–535. DOMA cannot survive under these principles.
Its unusual deviation from the tradit
ion of recognizing and accepting
state definitions of marriage operates
to deprive same-sex couples of
the benefits and responsibilities that
come with federal recognition of
their marriages. This is strong ev
idence of a law having the purpose
and effect of disapproval of a clas
s recognized and protected by state
law. DOMA's avowed purpose and pr
actical effect are to impose a
disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter
into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority
4
UNITED
STATES
v.
WINDSOR
Syllabus
of the States.
DOMA's history of enactment and its own text demonstrate that
interference with the equal dignit
y of same-sex marriages, conferred
by the States in the exercise of th
eir sovereign power, was more than
an incidental effect of the federal st
atute. It was its essence. BLAG's
arguments are just as candid about the congressional purpose.
DOMA's operation in practice confirms this purpose. It frustrates
New York's objective of eliminatin
g inequality by writing inequality
into the entire United States Code.
DOMA's principal effect is to iden
tify and make unequal a subset of
state-sanctioned marriages. It co
ntrives to deprive some couples
married under the laws of their Stat
e, but not others, of both rights
and responsibilities, creating tw
o contradictory marriage regimes
within the same State. It also forces same-sex couples to live as mar
-
ried for the purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of
federal law, thus diminishing the st
ability and predictability of basic
personal relations the State has fo
und it proper to acknowledge and
protect. Pp. 20–26.
699 F. 3d 169, affirmed.
K
ENNEDY
,
J., delivered the opinion of
the Court, in which G
INSBURG
,
B
REYER
, S
OTOMAYOR
,
and K
AGAN
,
JJ., joined.
R
OBERTS
,
C. J., filed a
dissenting opinion. S
CALIA
,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
T
HOMAS
,
J., joined, and in which R
OBERTS
,
C. J., joined as to Part I.
A
LITO
,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which T
HOMAS
,
J., joined as to
Parts II and III.
_________________
_________________
1
Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
-
ington, D. C. 20543,
of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 12–307
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
EDITH SCHLAIN
WINDSOR,
IN HER CAPACITY AS EXECUTOR OF THE
ESTATE
OF
THEA CLARA SPYER,
ET AL
.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 26, 2013]
J
USTICE
K
ENNEDY
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Two women then resident in New York were married
in a lawful ceremony in Ontario, Canada, in 2007. Edith
Windsor and Thea Spyer returned to their home in New
York City. When Spyer died in 2009, she left her entire
estate to Windsor. Windsor sought to claim the estate tax
exemption for surviving spouses. She was barred from
doing so, however, by a federal law, the Defense of Mar
-
riage Act, which excludes a same-sex partner from the
definition of “spouse” as that term is used in federal stat
-
utes. Windsor paid the taxes but filed suit to challenge
the constitutionality of this provision. The United States
District Court and the Court of Appeals ruled that this
portion of the statute is unconstitutional and ordered the
United States to pay Windsor a refund. This Court granted
certiorari and now affirms the judgment in Windsor's
favor.
I
In 1996, as some States were beginning to consider the
concept of same-sex marriage, see,
e.g.
,
Baehr
v.
Lewin
, 74
2
UNITED
STATES
v.
WINDSOR
Opinion of the Court
Haw. 530, 852 P. 2d 44 (1993), and before any State had
acted to permit it, Congress
enacted the Defense of Mar
-
riage Act (DOMA), 110 Stat. 2419. DOMA contains two
operative sections: Section 2, which has not been chal
-
lenged here, allows States to refuse to recognize same-sex
marriages performed under the laws of other States. See
28 U. S. C. §1738C
.
Section 3 is at issue here. It amends the Dictionary Act
in Title 1, §7, of the United States Code to provide a fed-
eral definition of “marriage” and “spouse.” Section 3 of
DOMA provides as follows:
“In determining the meaning of any Act of Con
-
gress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of
the various administrative bu
reaus and agencies of the
United States, the word ‘marriage' means only a
legal union between one man and one woman as hus
-
band and wife, and the word ‘spouse' refers only to a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”
1 U. S. C. §7.
The definitional provision does not by its terms forbid
States from enacting laws pe
rmitting same-sex marriages
or civil unions or providing st
ate benefits to residents in
that status. The enactment's comprehensive definition of
marriage for purposes of all federal statutes and other
regulations or directives cove
red by its terms, however,
does control over 1,000 federal laws in which marital or
spousal status is addressed as a matter of federal law. See
GAO, D. Shah, Defense of Marriage Act: Update to Prior
Report 1 (GAO–04–353R, 2004).
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer met in New York City in
1963 and began a long-term relationship. Windsor and
Spyer registered as domestic partners when New York
City gave that right to same-sex couples in 1993. Con
-
cerned about Spyer's health, the couple made the 2007 trip
to Canada for their marriage, but they continued to reside
3
Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)
Opinion of the Court
in New York City. The State of New York deems their
Ontario marriage to be a valid one. See 699 F. 3d 169,
177–178 (CA2 2012).
Spyer died in February 2009,
and left her entire estate
to Windsor. Because DOMA de
nies federal recognition to
same-sex spouses, Windsor did not qualify for the marital
exemption from the federal estate tax, which excludes
from taxation “any interest in property which passes or
has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse.” 26
U.
S. C. §2056(a). Windsor paid $363,053 in estate taxes
and sought a refund. The Internal Revenue Service de
-
nied the refund, concluding that, under DOMA, Windsor
was not a “surviving spouse.” Windsor commenced
this refund suit in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York. She contended
that DOMA violates the guar
antee of equal protection,
as applied to the Federal Government through the Fifth
Amendment.
While the tax refund suit was pending, the Attorney
General of the United States notified the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §530D,
that the Department of Justice
would no longer defend the
constitutionality of DOMA's §3. Noting that “the Depart
-
ment has previously defended DOMA against . . . chal
-
lenges involving legally married same-sex couples,” App.
184, the Attorney General informed Congress that “the
President has concluded that given a number of factors,
including a documented history of discrimination, classifi
-
cations based on sexual orientation should be subject to
a heightened standard of scrutiny.”
Id.,
at 191. The De
-
partment of Justice has submitted many §530D letters
over the years refusing to defend laws it deems unconsti
-
tutional, when, for instance, a federal court has rejected
the Government's defense of a statute and has issued a
judgment against it. This case is unusual, however, be
-
cause the §530D letter was not preceded by an adverse
15
Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)
S
CALIA
,
J., dissenting
A
There are many remarkable things about the majority's
merits holding. The first is how rootless and shifting its
justifications are. For example, the opinion starts with
seven full pages about the traditional power of States to
define domestic relations—initially fooling many readers,
I am sure, into thinking that
this is a federalism opinion.
But we are eventually told that “it is unnecessary to de
-
cide whether this federal intrusion on state power is a vio
-
lation of the Constitution,”
and that “[t]he State's power
in defining the marital relation is of central relevance
in this case quite apart from principles of federalism” be-
cause “the State's decision to give this class of persons
the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and
status of immense import.”
Ante,
at 18. But no one ques
-
tions the power of the States to define marriage (with the
concomitant conferral of dignity and status), so what is the
point of devoting seven pages
to describing how long and
well established that power is? Even after the opinion has
formally disclaimed reliance upon principles of federalism,
mentions of “the usual tradition of recognizing and accept
-
ing state definitions of marriage” continue. See,
e.g., ante,
at 20. What to make of this? The opinion never explains.
My guess is that the majority, while reluctant to suggest
that defining the meaning of “marriage” in federal stat
-
utes is unsupported by any of the Federal Government's
enumerated powers,
4
nonetheless needs some rhetorical
basis to support its pretense that today's prohibition of
——————
4
Such a suggestion would be impossible, given the Federal Govern
-
ment's long history of making pr
onouncements regarding marriage—for
example, conditioning Utah's entry
into the Union upon its prohibition
of polygamy. See Act of July 16, 1894, ch. 138, §3, 28 Stat. 108 (“The
constitution [of Utah]” must provide “perfect toleration of religious
sentiment,” “
Provided
, That polygamous or plural marriages are
forever prohibited”).
16
UNITED
STATES
v.
WINDSOR
S
CALIA
,
J., dissenting
laws excluding same-sex marriage is confined to the Fed
-
eral Government (leaving the second, state-law shoe to be
dropped later, maybe next Term). But I am only guessing.
Equally perplexing are the opinion's references to “the
Constitution's guarantee of equality.”
Ibid
.
Near the end
of the opinion, we are told that although the “equal protec
-
tion guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes [the]
Fifth Amendment [due process] right all the more specific
and all the better understood and preserved”—what can
that
mean?—“the Fifth Amendment itself withdraws from
Government the power to degrade or demean in the way
this law does.”
Ante,
at 25. The only possible interpreta
-
tion of this statement is that the Equal Protection Clause,
even the Equal Protection Clause as incorporated in the
Due Process Clause, is not the basis for today's holding.
But the portion of the majority opinion that explains why
DOMA is unconstitutional (Part IV) begins by citing
Bol
-
ling
v.
Sharpe
, 347 U. S. 497 (1954),
Department of Agri
-
culture
v.
Moreno
, 413 U. S. 528 (1973), and
Romer
v.
Evans
, 517 U. S. 620 (1996)—
all
of which are equal
-
protection cases.
5
And those three cases are the
only
authorities that the Court cites in Part IV about the Con
-
stitution's meaning, except for its citation of
Lawrence
v.
Texas
, 539 U. S. 558 (2003) (not an equal-protection case)
to support its passing assertion that the Constitution
protects the “moral and sexual choices” of same-sex cou
-
ples,
ante,
at 23.
Moreover, if this is meant to be an equal-protection
opinion, it is a confusing one. The opinion does not resolve
and indeed does not even mention what had been the
——————
5
Since the Equal Protecti
on Clause technically
applies only against
the States, see U. S. Const., Amdt. 14,
Bolling
and
Moreno
, dealing
with federal action, relied upon “the equal protection component of the
Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment,”
Moreno
, 413 U. S., at
533.
23
Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)
S
CALIA
,
J., dissenting
couples in same-sex marriages.
Supra,
at 18. How easy it
is, indeed how inevitable, to
reach the same conclusion
with regard to state laws denying same-sex couples mari
-
tal status. Consider how easy (inevitable) it is to make the
following substitutions in a passage from today's opinion
ante
, at 22:
“
DOMA's
This state law's
principal effect is to identify
a subset of
state-sanctioned marriages
constitution
-
ally protected sexual relationships,
see
Lawrence,
and
make them unequal. The principal purpose is to im
-
pose inequality, not for other reasons like govern
-
mental efficiency. Responsibilities, as well as rights,
enhance the dignity and integrity of the person. And
DOMA
this state law
contrives to deprive some cou
-
ples
married under the laws of their State
enjoying
constitutionally protected sexual relationships
, but not
other couples, of both rights and responsibilities.”
Or try this passage, from
ante
, at 22–23:
“
[DOMA]
This state law
tells those couples, and all
the world, that their otherwise valid
marriages
rela
-
tionships
are unworthy of
federal
state
recognition.
This places same-sex couples in an unstable position
of being in a second-tier
marriage
relationship
. The
differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral
and sexual choices the Constitution protects, see
Lawrence
, . . . .”
Or this, from
ante
, at 23—which does not even require
alteration, except as to the invented number:
“And it humiliates tens of thousands of children now
being raised by same-sex couples. The law in question
makes it even more difficult for the children to under
-
stand the integrity and closeness of their own family
and its concord with other families in their commu-
nity and in their daily lives.”
24
UNITED
STATES
v.
WINDSOR
S
CALIA
,
J., dissenting
Similarly transposable passa
ges—deliberately transpos-
able, I think—abound. In sum, that Court which finds it
so horrific that Congress irrationally and hatefully robbed
same-sex couples of the “per
sonhood and dignity” which
state legislatures conferred up
on them, will of a certitude
be similarly appalled by state legislatures' irrational and
hateful failure to acknowledg
e that “personhood and dig-
nity” in the first place.
Ante
, at 26
.
As far as this Court is
concerned, no one should be fooled; it is just a matter of
listening and waiting for the other shoe.
By formally declaring
anyone opposed to same-sex
marriage an enemy of human decency, the majority arms
well every challenger to a state law restricting marriage to
its traditional definition. Henceforth those challengers
will lead with this Court's declaration that there is “no
legitimate purpose” served by such a law, and will claim
that the traditional definition has “the purpose and effect
to disparage and to injure” the “personhood and dignity”
of same-sex couples, see
ante,
at 25, 26. The majority's
limiting assurance will be meaningless in the face of lan
-
guage like that, as the majority
well knows. That is why
the language is there. The result will be a judicial distor
-
tion of our society's debate over marriage—a debate that
can seem in need of our clumsy “help” only to a member of
this institution.
As to that debate: Few public controversies touch an
institution so central to the lives of so many, and few
inspire such attendant passion by good people on all
sides.
Few public controversies will
ever demonstrate so vividly
the beauty of what our Framers gave us, a gift the Court
pawns today to buy its stolen moment in the spotlight: a
system of government that permits us to rule
ourselves
.
Since DOMA's passage, citizens on all sides of the question
have seen victories and they have seen defeats. There
have been plebiscites, legislation, persuasion, and loud
voices—in other words, democracy. Victories in one place
25
Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)
S
CALIA
,
J., dissenting
for some, see North Carolina
Const., Amdt. 1 (providing
that “[m]arriage between one man and one woman is the
only domestic legal union that shall be valid or recognized
in this State”) (approved by a popular vote, 61% to 39%
on May 8, 2012),
6
are offset by victories in other places for
others, see Maryland Question 6 (establishing “that Mary
-
land's civil marriage laws allow gay and lesbian couples to
obtain a civil marriage license”) (approved by a popular
vote, 52% to 48%, on November 6, 2012).
7
Even in a
sin
-
gle State
, the question has come out differently on differ
-
ent occasions. Compare Maine
Question 1 (permitting “the
State of Maine to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples”) (approved by a po
pular vote, 53% to 47%, on
November 6, 2012)
8
with Maine Question 1 (rejecting “the
new law that lets same-sex co
uples marry”) (approved by a
popular vote, 53% to 47%, on November 3, 2009).
9
In the majority's telling, this story is black-and-white:
Hate your neighbor or come al
ong with us. The truth is
more complicated. It is hard
to admit that one's political
opponents are not monsters, especially in a struggle like
this one, and the challenge in the end proves more than
today's Court can handle. Too bad. A reminder that dis
-
agreement over something so fundamental as marriage
can still be politically legitimate would have been a fit
task for what in earlier time
s was called the judicial tem
-
perament. We might have cove
red ourselves with honor
today, by promising all sides of this debate that it was
——————
6
North Carolina State Board of Electi
ons, Official Results: Primary
Election of May 8, 2012, Constitutional Amendment.
7
Maryland State Board of Elections, Official 2012 Presidential Gen
-
eral Election Results for All St
ate Questions, Question 06.
8
Maine Bureau of Elections, Nov. 3, 2009, Referendum Tabulation
(Question 1).
9
Maine Bureau of Elections, Nov. 6, 2012, Referendum Election
Tabulations (Question 1).
17
Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)
A
LITO
,
J., dissenting
proper.”
Ante
, at 25 (emphasis added).
To the extent that the Court takes the position that the
question of same-sex marriage should be resolved primar
-
ily at the state level, I wholeheartedly agree. I hope that
the Court will ultimately permit the people of each State
to decide this question for the
mselves. Unless the Court is
willing to allow this to occur, the whiffs of federalism in
the today's opinion of the Court will soon be scattered to
the wind.
In any event, §3 of DOMA, in my view, does not en
-
croach on the prerogatives of
the States, assuming of
course that the many federal statutes affected by DOMA
have not already done so. Section 3 does not prevent any
State from recognizing same-sex marriage or from extend
-
ing to same-sex couples any right, privilege, benefit, or
obligation stemming from state law. All that §3 does is to
define a class of persons to whom federal law extends cer
-
tain special benefits and upon whom federal law imposes
certain special burdens. In these provisions, Congress
used marital status as a way of defining this class—in
part, I assume, because it viewed marriage as a valua-
ble institution to be fostered and in part because it viewed
married couples as comprising a unique type of economic
unit that merits special regulatory treatment. Assuming
that Congress has the power
under the Constitution to
enact the laws affected by §3, Congress has the power to
define the category of persons to whom those laws apply.
* * *
For these reasons, I would hold that §3 of DOMA does
not violate the Fifth Amendment. I respectfully dissent.