Sentenza

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE CO. v. KNOWLES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE CO.
v. KNOWLES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 11–1450. Argued January 7, 2013—Decided March 19, 2013
The Class Action Fairness Act of 20
05 (CAFA) gives federal district courts original jurisdic tion over class actions in which, among other things, the matter in controversy ex ceeds $5 million in sum or value,
28 U. S. C. §§1332(d)(2), (5), and provides that to determine whether
a matter exceeds that amount the “claims of the individual class
members must be aggregated,” §1332(d)(6). When respondent
Knowles filed a proposed class action in Arkansas state court against
petitioner Standard Fire Insurance Company, he stipulated that he
and the class would seek less than $5 million in damages. Pointing
to CAFA, petitioner removed the case to the Federal District Court,
but it remanded to the state court, concluding that the amount in
controversy fell below the CAFA threshold in light of Knowles' stipu
- lation, even though it found that the amount would have fallen above
the threshold absent the stipulation. The Eighth Circuit declined to
hear petitioner's appeal. Held : Knowles' stipulation does not de
feat federal jurisdiction under CAFA. Pp. 3 − 7.
(a)
Here, the precertification stip
ulation can tie Knowles' hands be
-
cause stipulations are binding on
the party who makes them, see
Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of
Law
v.
Martinez
, 561 U. S. ___. However, the stipulation does not
speak for those Knowles purports to
represent, for a plaintiff who
files a proposed class action canno
t legally bind members of the pro
-
posed class before the class is certified. See
Smith
v.
Bayer Corp.
,
564 U. S. ___, ___. Because Knowles
lacked authority to concede the
amount in controversy for absent class members, the District Court
wrongly concluded that his stipul
ation could overcome its finding
that the CAFA jurisdictional th
reshold had been met. Pp. 3
−
4.
2
STANDARD FIRE INS. CO.
v.
KNOWLES
Syllabus
(b)
Knowles concedes that federa
l jurisdiction cannot be based on
contingent future events. Yet, because a stipulation must be binding
and a named plaintiff cannot bind precertification class members, the
amount he stipulated is in effect contingent. CAFA does not forbid a
federal court to consider the possibility that a nonbinding, amount
-
limiting, stipulation may not survive
the class certification process.
To hold otherwise would, for CAFA
jurisdictional purposes, treat a
nonbinding stipulation as if it were binding, exalt form over sub
-
stance, and run counter to CAFA's objective: ensuring “Federal court
consideration of interstate cases of
national importance.”
§2(b)(2),
119 Stat. 5.
It may be simpler for a federal district court to value the amount in
controversy on the basis of a stipul
ation, but ignoring a nonbinding
stipulation merely requires the fede
ral judge to do what she must do
in cases with no stipulation: aggregate the individual class members'
claims. While individual plaintiffs may avoid removal to federal
court by stipulating to amounts th
at fall below the federal jurisdic
-
tional threshold, the key characteri
stic of such stipulations—missing
here—is that they are legally bi
nding on all plaintiffs. Pp. 4
−
7.
Vacated and remanded.
B
REYER
,
J.,
delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
_________________
_________________
1
Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
-
ington, D. C. 20543,
of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 11–1450
THE STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,
PETITIONER
v.
GREG KNOWLES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[March 19, 2013]
J
USTICE
B
REYER
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) provides
that the federal “district courts shall have original juris
-
diction” over a civil “class action” if, among other things,
the “matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$5,000,000.” 28 U. S. C. §§1332(d)(2), (5). The statute
adds that “to determine whet
her the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000,” the “claims of
the individual class members shall be aggregated.”
§1332(d)(6).
The question presented concerns a class-action plaintiff
who stipulates, prior to certification of the class, that he,
and the class he seeks to represent, will not seek damages
that exceed $5 million in tota
l. Does that stipulation
remove the case from CAFA's scope? In our view, it does
not.
I
In April 2011 respondent, Greg Knowles, filed this
proposed class action in an Arkansas state court against
petitioner, the Standard Fire Insurance Company.
Knowles claimed that, when the company had made cer
-
2
STANDARD FIRE INS. CO.
v.
KNOWLES
Opinion of the Court
tain homeowner's insurance loss payments, it had un
-
lawfully failed to include a general contractor fee. And
Knowles sought to certify a class of “hundreds, and pos
-
sibly thousands” of similarly harmed Arkansas policyhold
-
ers. App. to Pet. for Cert. 66. In describing the relief
sought, the complaint says that the “Plaintiff and Class
stipulate they will seek to recover total aggregate damages
of less than five million dollars.”
Id.
,
at 60. An attached
affidavit stipulates that Knowles “will not at any time
during this case . . . seek damages for the class . . . in
excess of $5,000,000 in the aggregate.”
Id.
,
at 75.
On May 18, 2011, the company, pointing to CAFA's
jurisdictional provision, removed the case to Federal Dis
-
trict Court. See 28 U. S. C. §1332(d); §1453. Knowles
argued for remand on the ground that the District Court
lacked jurisdiction. He claimed that the “sum or value” of
the “amount in controversy” fell beneath the $5 million
threshold. App. to Pet. for Cert. 2. On the basis of evi
-
dence presented by the company, the District Court found
that that the “sum or value” of the “amount in contro
-
versy” would, in the absence of the stipulation, have fallen
just above the $5 million threshold.
Id.,
at 2, 8. Nonethe
-
less, in light of Knowles' stipulation, the court concluded
that the amount fell beneath the threshold. The court con
-
sequently ordered the case remanded to the state court.
Id.,
at 15.
The company appealed from the remand order, but the
Eighth Circuit declined to hear the appeal.
Id.
, at 1. See
28 U. S. C. §1453(c)(1) (2006 ed., Supp. V) (providing
discretion to hear an appeal from a remand order). The
company petitioned for a writ of certiorari. And, in light of
divergent views in the lower courts, we granted the writ.
Compare
Frederick
v.
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co.
, 683
F.
3d 1242, 1247 (CA10 2012) (a proposed class-action
representative's “attempt to limit damages in the com
-
plaint is not dispositive when determining the amount in