Sentenza

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES UNITED STATES v. ALVAREZ

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES v. ALVAREZ
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 11–210. Argued February 22, 2012—Decided June 28, 2012
The Stolen Valor Act makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals and provides an enhanced penalty if the Congressional Medal of Honor is involved. 18 U. S. C. §§704 (b), (c).Respondent pleaded guilty to a charge of falsely claiming that he had received the Medal of Honor, but reserved his right to appeal his claim that the Act is unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding the Act invalid under the First Amendment.
Held: The judgment is affirmed. Pp. 3−18.
617 F. 3d 1198, affirmed. JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concluded that the Act infringes upon speech protected by the First Amendment. Pp. 3–18.
(a) The Constitution “demands that content-based restrictions onspeech be presumed invalid . . . and that the Government bear the burden of showing their constitutionality.” Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656, 660.
Content-based restrictions on speech have been permitted only for a few historic categories of speech, including incitement, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, so-called “fightingwords,” child pornography, fraud, true threats, and speech presentingsome grave and imminent threat the Government has the power to prevent.
Absent from these few categories is any general exception for false statements. The Government argues that cases such as Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46, 52, support its claim thatfalse statements have no value and hence no First Amendment protection. But all the Government's quotations derive from cases dis2
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cussing defamation, fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated with a false statement. In those decisions the falsity of thespeech at issue was not irrelevant to the Court's analysis, but neither was it determinative. These prior decisions have not confronted ameasure, like the Stolen Valor Act, that targets falsity and nothing more.
Even when considering some instances of defamation or fraud, theCourt has instructed that falsity alone may not suffice to bring thespeech outside the First Amendment; the statement must be a knowing and reckless falsehood. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U. S. 254, 280. Here, the Government seeks to convert a rule that limits liability even in defamation cases where the law permits recovery for tortious wrongs into a rule that expands liability in a different, far greater realm of discourse and expression.
The Government's three examples of false-speech regulation that courts generally have found permissible do not establish a principlethat all proscriptions of false statements are exempt from rigorousFirst Amendment scrutiny. The criminal prohibition of a false statement made to Government officials in communications concerning official matters, 18 U. S. C. §1001, does not lead to the broaderproposition that false statements are unprotected when made to anyperson, at any time, in any context. As for perjury statutes, perjured statements lack First Amendment protection not simply because theyare false, but because perjury undermines the function and province of the law and threatens the integrity of judgments. Finally, thereare statutes that prohibit falsely representing that one is speaking onbehalf of the Government, or prohibit impersonating a Governmentofficer. These examples, to the extent that they implicate fraud orspeech integral to criminal conduct, are inapplicable here.
While there may exist “some categories of speech that have beenhistorically unprotected,” but that the Court has not yet specificallyidentified or discussed, United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. ___, ___, the Government has not demonstrated that false statements should constitute a new category. Pp. 3−10.
(b)
The Act seeks to control and suppress all false statements on this one subject in almost limitless times and settings without regardto whether the lie was made for the purpose of material gain. Permitting the Government to decree this speech to be a criminal offensewould endorse government authority to compile a list of subjects about which false statements are punishable. That governmental power has no clear limiting principle. Pp. 10−11.
(c)
The Court applies the “most exacting scrutiny” in assessing content-based restrictions on protected speech. Turner Broadcasting System Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 642. The Act does not satisfy that
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scrutiny. While the Government's interest in protecting the integrity of the Medal of Honor is beyond question, the First Amendment requires that there be a direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented. Here, that link has not been shown. The Government points to no evidence supporting its claim that the public's general perception of military awards is diluted byfalse claims such as those made by respondent. And it has not shown, and cannot show, why counterspeech, such as the ridicule respondent received online and in the press, would not suffice to achieve its interest.
In addition, when the Government seeks to regulate protectedspeech, the restriction must be the “least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.” Ashcroft, 542 U. S., at 666. Here, the Government could likely protect the integrity of the militaryawards system by creating a database of Medal winners accessibleand searchable on the Internet, as some private individuals have already done. Pp. 12−18.
JUSTICE BREYER, joined by JUSTICE KAGAN, concluded that because the Stolen Valor Act, as presently drafted, works disproportionateconstitutional harm, it fails intermediate scrutiny, and thus violatesthe First Amendment. Pp. 1−10.
(a)
In determining whether a statute violates the First Amendment, the Court has often found it appropriate to examine the fit between statutory ends and means, taking into account the seriousness of the speech-related harm the provision will likely cause, the nature and importance of the provision's countervailing objectives, the extent to which the statute will tend to achieve those objectives, andwhether there are other, less restrictive alternatives. “Intermediate scrutiny” describes this approach. Since false factual statements areless likely than true factual statements to make a valuable contribution to the marketplace of ideas, and the government often has goodreason to prohibit such false speech, but its regulation can threaten speech-related harm, such an approach is applied here. Pp. 1−3.
(b)
The Act should be read as criminalizing only false factual statements made with knowledge of their falsity and with intent thatthey be taken as true. Although the Court has frequently said or implied that false factual statements enjoy little First Amendment protection, see, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 340, those statements cannot be read to mean “no protection at all.” False factual statements serve useful human objectives in many contexts. Moreover, the threat of criminal prosecution for making a false statement can inhibit the speaker from making true statements, thereby “chilling” a kind of speech that lies at the First Amendment'sheart. See id., at 340−341. And the pervasiveness of false factual
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statements provides a weapon to a government broadly empowered toprosecute falsity without more. Those who are unpopular may fearthat the government will use that weapon selectively against them.
Although there are many statutes and common-law doctrines making the utterance of certain kinds of false statements unlawful, they tend to be narrower than the Act, in that they limit the scope of their application in various ways, for example, by requiring proof of specific harm to identifiable victims. The Act lacks any such limiting features. Although it prohibits only knowing and intentional falsehoodsabout readily verifiable facts within the personal knowledge of thespeaker, it otherwise ranges broadly, and that breadth means that itcreates a significant risk of First Amendment harm. Pp. 3−8.
(c)
The Act nonetheless has substantial justification. It seeks to protect the interests of those who have sacrificed their health and life for their country by seeking to preserve intact the country's recognition of that sacrifice in the form of military honors. P. 8.
(d)
It may, however, be possible substantially to achieve the Government's objective in less burdensome ways. The First Amendment risks flowing from the Act's breadth of coverage could be diminished or eliminated by a more finely tailored statute, for example, a statutethat requires a showing that the false statement caused specific harm or is focused on lies more likely to be harmful or on contexts wheresuch lies are likely to cause harm. Pp. 8−10.
KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which KAGAN, J., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined.
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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in thepreliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested tonotify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in orderthat corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 11–210
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. XAVIER ALVAREZ
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June 28, 2012]
JUSTICE KENNEDY announced the judgment of theCourt and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join.
Lying was his habit. Xavier Alvarez, the respondent here, lied when he said that he played hockey for theDetroit Red Wings and that he once married a starlet fromMexico. But when he lied in announcing he held the Congressional Medal of Honor, respondent ventured onto new ground; for that lie violates a federal criminal statute, theStolen Valor Act of 2005. 18 U. S. C. §704.
In 2007, respondent attended his first public meeting as a board member of the Three Valley Water District Board.The board is a governmental entity with headquarters inClaremont, California. He introduced himself as follows: “I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001.Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. I got wounded many times by the same guy.” 617
F. 3d 1198, 1201–1202 (CA9 2010). None of this was true. For all the record shows, respondent's statements werebut a pathetic attempt to gain respect that eluded him. The statements do not seem to have been made to secure
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employment or financial benefits or admission to privilegesreserved for those who had earned the Medal.
Respondent was indicted under the Stolen Valor Actfor lying about the Congressional Medal of Honor at the meeting. The United States District Court for the Central District of California rejected his claim that the statute isinvalid under the First Amendment. Respondent pleadedguilty to one count, reserving the right to appeal on hisFirst Amendment claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision by a divided panel, found the Act invalid under the First Amendment and reversed the conviction. Id., at 1218. With further opinions on the issue, and over a dissent by seven judges, rehearing en banc was denied. 638 F. 3d 666 (2011). This Court granted certiorari. 565 U. S. ___ (2011).
After certiorari was granted, and in an unrelated case,the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, also in a decision by a divided panel, found the Act constitutional. United States v. Strandlof, 667 F. 3d 1146 (2012). So there is now a conflict in the Courts of Appealson the question of the Act's validity.
This is the second case in two Terms requiring the Courtto consider speech that can disparage, or attempt to steal, honor that belongs to those who fought for this Nation in battle. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U. S. ___ (2011) (hateful protests directed at the funeral of a serviceman who died in Iraq). Here the statement that the speaker held the Medal was an intended, undoubted lie.
It is right and proper that Congress, over a century ago,established an award so the Nation can hold in its high- est respect and esteem those who, in the course of carrying out the “supreme and noble duty of contributing to thedefense of the rights and honor of the nation,” Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 390 (1918), have acted with extraordinary honor. And it should be uncontested that this is a legitimate Government objective, indeed a
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most valued national aspiration and purpose. This does not end the inquiry, however. Fundamental constitutional principles require that laws enacted to honor the brave must be consistent with the precepts of the Constitution for which they fought.
The Government contends the criminal prohibition isa proper means to further its purpose in creating and awarding the Medal. When content-based speech regulation is in question, however, exacting scrutiny is required. Statutes suppressing or restricting speech must be judged by the sometimes inconvenient principles of the FirstAmendment. By this measure, the statutory provisions under which respondent was convicted must be held invalid, and his conviction must be set aside.
I Respondent's claim to hold the Congressional Medal of Honor was false. There is no room to argue about interpretation or shades of meaning. On this premise, respondent violated §704(b); and, because the lie concerned the Congressional Medal of Honor, he was subject to an enhanced penalty under subsection (c). Those statutory provisions are as follows: “(b) FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT RECEIPT OF MILITARY DECORATIONS OR MEDALS.––Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States. . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or both. “(c) ENHANCED PENALTY FOR OFFENSES INVOLVING CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR.–– “(1) IN GENERAL.––If a decoration or medal involved in an offense under subsection (a) or (b) is a Congressional Medal of Honor, in lieu of the punishment provided in that subsection, the offender shall be fined under
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this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.”
Respondent challenges the statute as a content-based suppression of pure speech, speech not falling within any of the few categories of expression where content-basedregulation is permissible. The Government defends the statute as necessary to preserve the integrity and purposeof the Medal, an integrity and purpose it contends are compromised and frustrated by the false statements the statute prohibits. It argues that false statements “haveno First Amendment value in themselves,” and thus “are protected only to the extent needed to avoid chilling fully protected speech.” Brief for United States 18, 20. Although the statute covers respondent's speech, the Government argues that it leaves breathing room for protected speech, for example speech which might criticizethe idea of the Medal or the importance of the military. The Government's arguments cannot suffice to save the statute.
II “[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment meansthat government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535
U. S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, the Constitution “demands that content-based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid . . . and that the Government bear the burden of showing their constitutionality.” Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656, 660 (2004).
In light of the substantial and expansive threats to free expression posed by content-based restrictions, this Courthas rejected as “startling and dangerous” a “free-floatingtest for First Amendment coverage . . . [based on] an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op.,
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at 7). Instead, content-based restrictions on speech havebeen permitted, as a general matter, only when confined to the few “‘historic and traditional categories [of expression] long familiar to the bar,'” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5) (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 127 (1991) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment)). Among these categories areadvocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawlessaction, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); obscenity, see, e.g., Miller v. California, 413
U. S. 15 (1973); defamation, see, e.g., New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964) (providing substantial protection for speech about public figures); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974) (imposing some limits onliability for defaming a private figure); speech integral to criminal conduct, see, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490 (1949); so-called “fighting words,” see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942); child pornography, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 (1982); fraud, see Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976); true threats, see Watts v. United States, 394 U. S. 705 (1969) (per curiam); and speech presenting some graveand imminent threat the government has the power to prevent, see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 716 (1931), although a restriction under the last category is most difficult to sustain, see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). These categories have a historical foundation in the Court's free speech tradition. The vast realm of free speech and thought always protected in our tradition can still thrive, and even be furthered, by adherence to thosecategories and rules.
Absent from those few categories where the law allows content-based regulation of speech is any general exception to the First Amendment for false statements. This
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comports with the common understanding that some false statements are inevitable if there is to be an open and vigorous expression of views in public and private conversation, expression the First Amendment seeks to guarantee. See Sullivan, supra, at 271 (“Th[e] erroneousstatement is inevitable in free debate”).
The Government disagrees with this proposition. It cites language from some of this Court's precedents tosupport its contention that false statements have no valueand hence no First Amendment protection. See also Brief for Eugene Volokh et al. as Amici Curiae 2–11. These isolated statements in some earlier decisions do not support the Government's submission that false statements,as a general rule, are beyond constitutional protection.That conclusion would take the quoted language far fromits proper context. For instance, the Court has stated “[f]alse statements of fact are particularly valueless [because] they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas,” Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46, 52 (1988), and that false statements “are not protected by the First Amendment in the samemanner as truthful statements,” Brown v. Hartlage, 456
U. S. 45, 60–61 (1982). See also, e.g., Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, supra, at 771 (“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake”); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 171 (1979) (“Spreading false information in and of itself carries no First Amendment credentials”); Gertz, supra, at 340 (“[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact”); Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 75 (1964) (“[T]he knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection”).
These quotations all derive from cases discussing defamation, fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated with a false statement, such as an invasion of
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privacy or the costs of vexatious litigation. See Brief for United States 18–19. In those decisions the falsity ofthe speech at issue was not irrelevant to our analysis, but neither was it determinative. The Court has never endorsed the categorical rule the Government advances: thatfalse statements receive no First Amendment protection.Our prior decisions have not confronted a measure, likethe Stolen Valor Act, that targets falsity and nothing more.
Even when considering some instances of defamationand fraud, moreover, the Court has been careful to instruct that falsity alone may not suffice to bring the speech outside the First Amendment. The statement must be a knowing or reckless falsehood. See Sullivan, supra, at 280 (prohibiting recovery of damages for a defamatory falsehood made about a public official unless the statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”); seealso Garrison, supra, at 73 (“[E]ven when the utterance is false, the great principles of the Constitution which securefreedom of expression . . . preclude attaching adverseconsequences to any except the knowing or reckless falsehood”); Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U. S. 600, 620 (2003) (“False statement alone does not subject a fundraiser to fraud liability”).
The Government thus seeks to use this principle for a new purpose. It seeks to convert a rule that limits liability even in defamation cases where the law permits recovery for tortious wrongs into a rule that expands liability in a different, far greater realm of discourse and expression. That inverts the rationale for the exception. The requirements of a knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth as the condition for recovery in certain defamation cases exists to allow more speech, not less. A rule designed to tolerate certain speech ought not blossom tobecome a rationale for a rule restricting it.
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The Government then gives three examples of regulations on false speech that courts generally have found permissible: first, the criminal prohibition of a false statement made to a Government official, 18 U. S. C. §1001; second, laws punishing perjury; and third, prohibitions on the false representation that one is speaking as a Government official or on behalf of the Government, see, e.g., §912; §709. These restrictions, however, do not establish a principle that all proscriptions of false statements are exempt from exacting First Amendment scrutiny.
The federal statute prohibiting false statements toGovernment officials punishes “whoever, in any matterwithin the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government . . . makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation.” §1001. Section 1001's prohibition on false statements made to Government officials, in communications concerning official matters, does not lead to the broaderproposition that false statements are unprotected whenmade to any person, at any time, in any context.
The same point can be made about what the Court hasconfirmed is the “unquestioned constitutionality of perjury statutes,” both the federal statute, §1623, and its state-law equivalents. United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41, 54 (1978). See also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U. S. 36, 51, n. 10 (1961). It is not simply because perjuredstatements are false that they lack First Amendment protection. Perjured testimony “is at war with justice” because it can cause a court to render a “judgment not resting on truth.” In re Michael, 326 U. S. 224, 227 (1945). Perjury undermines the function and province of the law and threatens the integrity of judgments that are the basis of the legal system. See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U. S. 87, 97 (1993) (“To uphold the integrity of our trial system . . . the constitutionality of perjury statutes is unquestioned”). Unlike speech in other contexts, testiCite
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mony under oath has the formality and gravity necessary toremind the witness that his or her statements will be the basis for official governmental action, action that oftenaffects the rights and liberties of others. Sworn testimonyis quite distinct from lies not spoken under oath and simply intended to puff up oneself.
Statutes that prohibit falsely representing that one is speaking on behalf of the Government, or that prohibit impersonating a Government officer, also protect the integrity of Government processes, quite apart from merely restricting false speech. Title 18 U. S. C. §912, for example, prohibits impersonating an officer or employee of the United States. Even if that statute may not requireproving an “actual financial or property loss” resulting from the deception, the statute is itself confined to “maintain[ing] the general good repute and dignity of . . . government . . . service itself.” United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U. S. 702, 704 (1943) (internal quotation marks omitted). The same can be said for prohibitions on the unauthorized use of the names of federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a manner calculated to convey that the communication is approved, see §709, or using words such as “Federal” or “United States” in thecollection of private debts in order to convey that the communication has official authorization, see §712. These examples, to the extent that they implicate fraud or speech integral to criminal conduct, are inapplicable here.
As our law and tradition show, then, there are instances in which the falsity of speech bears upon whether it isprotected. Some false speech may be prohibited even ifanalogous true speech could not be. This opinion does not imply that any of these targeted prohibitions are somehow vulnerable. But it also rejects the notion that false speech should be in a general category that is presumptively unprotected.
Although the First Amendment stands against any
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“freewheeling authority to declare new categories ofspeech outside the scope of the First Amendment,” Stevens, 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9), the Court has acknowledged that perhaps there exist “some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected . . . but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed . . . inour case law.” Ibid. Before exempting a category of speech from the normal prohibition on content-based restrictions, however, the Court must be presented with “persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription,” Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn., 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 4). The Government has not demonstrated that false statements generally should constitute a new category of unprotected speech onthis basis.
III The probable, and adverse, effect of the Act on free- dom of expression illustrates, in a fundamental way, thereasons for the Law's distrust of content-based speech prohibitions. The Act by its plain terms applies to a false statementmade at any time, in any place, to any person. It can be assumed that it would not apply to, say, a theatrical performance. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U. S. 1, 20 (1990) (recognizing that some statements nominally purporting to contain false facts in reality “cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Still, the sweeping, quite unprecedented reach of the statute puts it in conflict with the First Amendment. Here the lie was made in a public meeting, but the statute would apply with equal force to personal, whispered conversations within a home. The statute seeks to control and suppress all false statements on this one subject in
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almost limitless times and settings. And it does so entirely without regard to whether the lie was made for the purpose of material gain. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U. S. 522, 539–540 (1987) (prohibiting a nonprofit corporation from exploiting the “commercial magnetism” of the word “Olympic” when organizing an athletic competition (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Permitting the government to decree this speech to be a criminal offense, whether shouted from the rooftops or made in a barely audible whisper, would endorse government authority to compile a list of subjects about whichfalse statements are punishable. That governmental power has no clear limiting principle. Our constitutional tradition stands against the idea that we need Oceania's Ministry of Truth. See G. Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) (Centennial ed. 2003). Were this law to be sustained, there could be an endless list of subjects the National Government or the States could single out. Where false claims are made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable considerations, say offers of employment,it is well established that the Government may restrictspeech without affronting the First Amendment. See, e.g., Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U. S., at 771 (noting that fraudulent speech generally falls outside the protections of the First Amendment). But the Stolen Valor Act is not so limited in its reach. Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful discourse alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent any evidence that the speech wasused to gain a material advantage, it would give government a broad censorial power unprecedented in thisCourt's cases or in our constitutional tradition. The mere potential for the exercise of that power casts a chill, a chill the First Amendment cannot permit if free speech, thought, and discourse are to remain a foundation of our freedom.
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IV The previous discussion suffices to show that the Act conflicts with free speech principles. But even when examined within its own narrow sphere of operation, the Act cannot survive. In assessing content-based restrictions on protected speech, the Court has not adopted a freewheeling approach, see Stevens, 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (“The First Amendment's guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survivean ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits”),but rather has applied the “most exacting scrutiny.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 642 (1994). Although the objectives the Government seeksto further by the statute are not without significance, theCourt must, and now does, find the Act does not satisfy exacting scrutiny. The Government is correct when it states military medals “serve the important public function of recognizing andexpressing gratitude for acts of heroism and sacrifice in military service,” and also “‘foste[r] morale, mission accomplishment and esprit de corps' among service members.” Brief for United States 37, 38. General GeorgeWashington observed that an award for valor would “cherish a virtuous ambition in . . . soldiers, as well as foster and encourage every species of military merit.” General Orders of George Washington Issued at Newburgh on theHudson, 1782–1783 (Aug. 7, 1782), p. 30 (E. Boynton ed.1883). Time has not diminished this idea. In periods ofwar and peace alike public recognition of valor and noble sacrifice by men and women in uniform reinforces thepride and national resolve that the military relies upon to fulfill its mission. These interests are related to the integrity of the military honors system in general, and the Congressional Medal of Honor in particular. Although millions have served with brave resolve, the Medal, which is the highest
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military award for valor against an enemy force, has been given just 3,476 times. Established in 1861, the Medal is reserved for those who have distinguished themselves “conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty.” 10 U. S. C. §§3741 (Army), 6241 (Navy and Marine Corps), 8741 (Air Force), 14 U. S. C. §491 (Coast Guard). The stories of those who earned the Medal inspire and fascinate, from Dakota Meyer who in 2009 drove five times into the midst of a Taliban ambush to save 36 lives, see Curtis, President Obama Awards Medal of Honor to Dakota Meyer, The White House Blog (Sept. 15, 2011) (all Internet materialsas visited June 25, 2012, and available in Clerk of Court's case file); to Desmond Doss who served as an army medic on Okinawa and on June 5, 1945, rescued 75 fellow soldiers, and who, after being wounded, gave up his ownplace on a stretcher so others could be taken to safety, seeAmerica's Heroes 88–90 (J. Willbanks ed. 2011); to William Carney who sustained multiple gunshot wounds tothe head, chest, legs, and arm, and yet carried the flag to ensure it did not touch the ground during the Unionarmy's assault on Fort Wagner in July 1863, id., at 44–45. The rare acts of courage the Medal celebrates led President Truman to say he would “rather have that medal round my neck than . . . be president of the United States.”Truman Gives No. 1 Army Medal to 15 Heroes, Washington Post, Oct. 13, 1945, p. 5. The Government's interest in protecting the integrity of the Medal of Honor is beyond question.
But to recite the Government's compelling interests is not to end the matter. The First Amendment requires that the Government's chosen restriction on the speech at issue be “actually necessary” to achieve its interest. Entertainment Merchants Assn., 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12). There must be a direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented. See ibid.
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Opinion of KENNEDY, J.
The link between the Government's interest in protectingthe integrity of the military honors system and the Act'srestriction on the false claims of liars like respondent has not been shown. Although appearing to concede that “an isolated misrepresentation by itself would not tarnish the meaning of military honors,” the Government asserts it is “common sense that false representations have the tendency to dilute the value and meaning of military awards,” Brief for United States 49, 54. It must be acknowledgedthat when a pretender claims the Medal to be his own, the lie might harm the Government by demeaning the highpurpose of the award, diminishing the honor it confirms, and creating the appearance that the Medal is awardedmore often than is true. Furthermore, the lie may offendthe true holders of the Medal. From one perspective it insults their bravery and high principles when falsehoodputs them in the unworthy company of a pretender.
Yet these interests do not satisfy the Government'sheavy burden when it seeks to regulate protected speech. See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 818 (2000). The Government points to noevidence to support its claim that the public's general perception of military awards is diluted by false claims such as those made by Alvarez. Cf. Entertainment Merchants Assn., supra, at ___–___ (slip op., at 12–13) (analyzing and rejecting the findings of research psychologists demonstrating the causal link between violent videogames and harmful effects on children). As one of the Government's amici notes “there is nothing that charlatans such as Xavier Alvarez can do to stain [the Medalwinners'] honor.” Brief for Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States et al. as Amici Curiae 1. This generalproposition is sound, even if true holders of the Medal might experience anger and frustration.
The lack of a causal link between the Government's stated interest and the Act is not the only way in which
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Opinion of KENNEDY, J.
the Act is not actually necessary to achieve the Government's stated interest. The Government has not shown, and cannot show, why counterspeech would not suffice to achieve its interest. The facts of this case indicate that the dynamics of free speech, of counterspeech, of refutation, can overcome the lie. Respondent lied at a public meeting. Even before the FBI began investigating him for his false statements “Alvarez was perceived as a phony,” 617 F. 3d, at 1211. Once the lie was made public, he wasridiculed online, see Brief for Respondent 3, his actions were reported in the press, see Ortega, Alvarez AgainDenies Claim, Ontario, CA, Inland Valley Daily Bulletin (Sept. 27, 2007), and a fellow board member called for his resignation, see, e.g., Bigham, Water District Rep Requests Alvarez Resign in Wake of False Medal Claim,San Bernardino Cty., CA, The Sun (May 21, 2008). There is good reason to believe that a similar fate would befallother false claimants. See Brief for Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici Curiae 30–33 (listing numerous examples of public exposure of falseclaimants). Indeed, the outrage and contempt expressed for respondent's lies can serve to reawaken and reinforce the public's respect for the Medal, its recipients, and itshigh purpose. The acclaim that recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor receive also casts doubt on the proposition that the public will be misled by the claims of charlatans or become cynical of those whose heroic deeds earned them the Medal by right. See, e.g., Well Done, Washington Post, Feb. 5, 1943, p. 8 (reporting on President Roosevelt's awarding the Congressional Medal of Honor to Maj. Gen. Alexander Vandegrift); Devroy, Medal of Honor Given to 2 Killed in Somalia, Washington Post, May 24, 1994, p. A6 (reporting on President Clinton's awarding the Congressional Medal of Honor to two special forces soldiers killed during operations in Somalia).
The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true. This is the ordinary course in a free society. The
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response to the unreasoned is the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simpletruth. See Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If there be time to exposethrough discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence”). The theory of our Constitution is “that the best test of truth is the powerof the thought to get itself accepted in the competition ofthe market,” Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The First Amendment itself ensures the right to respond to speech we do not like, and for good reason. Freedom of speech and thought flowsnot from the beneficence of the state but from the inalienable rights of the person. And suppression of speech bythe government can make exposure of falsity more difficult, not less so. Society has the right and civic duty toengage in open, dynamic, rational discourse. These ends are not well served when the government seeks to orchestrate public discussion through content-based mandates.
Expressing its concern that counterspeech is insuf- ficient, the Government responds that because “somemilitary records have been lost . . . some claims [are] unverifiable,” Brief for United States 50. This proves little, however; for without verifiable records, successful criminal prosecution under the Act would be more difficult in any event. So, in cases where public refutation will not serve the Government's interest, the Act will not either. In addition, the Government claims that “many [falseclaims] will remain unchallenged.” Id., at 55. The Government provides no support for the contention. And in any event, in order to show that public refutation is not an adequate alternative, the Government must demonstrate that unchallenged claims undermine the public's perception of the military and the integrity of its awards system. This showing has not been made.
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Opinion of KENNEDY, J.
It is a fair assumption that any true holders of the Medal who had heard of Alvarez's false claims would have been fully vindicated by the community's expression of outrage, showing as it did the Nation's high regard for the Medal. The same can be said for the Government's interest. The American people do not need the assistance of agovernment prosecution to express their high regard forthe special place that military heroes hold in our tradition. Only a weak society needs government protection or intervention before it pursues its resolve to preserve the truth. Truth needs neither handcuffs nor a badge for itsvindication.
In addition, when the Government seeks to regulateprotected speech, the restriction must be the “least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.” Ashcroft, 542 U. S., at 666. There is, however, at least one less speech-restrictive means by which the Governmentcould likely protect the integrity of the military awards system. A Government-created database could list Congressional Medal of Honor winners. Were a database accessible through the Internet, it would be easy to verifyand expose false claims. It appears some private individuals have already created databases similar to this, see Brief for Respondent 25, and at least one data- base of past winners is online and fully searchable, seeCongressional Medal of Honor Society, Full Archive, http://www.cmohs.org/recipient-archive.php. The Solicitor General responds that although Congress and the Department of Defense investigated the feasibility of establishing a database in 2008, the Government “concluded that such a database would be impracticable and insufficiently comprehensive.” Brief for United States 55. Without more explanation, it is difficult to assess the Government's claim, especially when at least one database of Congressional Medal of Honor winners already exists.
The Government may have responses to some of these criticisms, but there has been no clear showing of the
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necessity of the statute, the necessity required by exactingscrutiny.
* * * The Nation well knows that one of the costs of the First Amendment is that it protects the speech we detest as well as the speech we embrace. Though few might find respondent's statements anything but contemptible, hisright to make those statements is protected by the Constitution's guarantee of freedom of speech and expression. The Stolen Valor Act infringes upon speech protected by the First Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
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BREYER, J., concurring in judgment
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 11–210
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. XAVIER ALVAREZ
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June 28, 2012]
JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN joins, con-curring in the judgment.
I agree with the plurality that the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 violates the First Amendment. But I do not rest my conclusion upon a strict categorical analysis. Ante, at 4–
10. Rather, I base that conclusion upon the fact that the statute works First Amendment harm, while the Government can achieve its legitimate objectives in less restrictive ways.
I In determining whether a statute violates the FirstAmendment, this Court has often found it appropriate toexamine the fit between statutory ends and means. In doing so, it has examined speech-related harms, justifications, and potential alternatives. In particular, it hastaken account of the seriousness of the speech-related harm the provision will likely cause, the nature and importance of the provision's countervailing objectives, the extent to which the provision will tend to achieve those objectives, and whether there are other, less restrictiveways of doing so. Ultimately the Court has had to determine whether the statute works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to its justifications.Sometimes the Court has referred to this approach as“intermediate scrutiny,” sometimes as “proportionality”
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review, sometimes as an examination of “fit,” and sometimes it has avoided the application of any label at all.See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512
U. S. 622, 641–652 (1994) (intermediate scrutiny); Randall
v.
Sorrell, 548 U. S. 230, 249 (2006) (plurality opinion) (proportionality); Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y.
v.
Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 480 (1989) (requiring a “fit” be- tween means and ends that is “‘in proportion to the interest served'”); In re R. M. J., 455 U. S. 191, 203 (1982) (“[I]nterference with speech must be in proportion to the [substantial governmental] interest served”); Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968).
Regardless of the label, some such approach is necessary if the First Amendment is to offer proper protection in the many instances in which a statute adversely affects constitutionally protected interests but warrants neithernear-automatic condemnation (as “strict scrutiny” implies) nor near-automatic approval (as is implicit in “rationalbasis” review). See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., supra, at 641–652 (“must-carry” cable regulations); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980) (nonmisleading commercial speech); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428, 433– 434 (1992) (election regulation); Pickering, supra, at 568 (government employee speech); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968) (application of generally appli- cable laws to expressive conduct). I have used the term “proportionality” to describe this approach. Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U. S. 357, 388 (2002) (dissenting opinion); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532
U. S. 514, 536 (2001) (concurring opinion); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 402–403 (2000) (concurring opinion). But in this case, the Court's term “intermediate scrutiny” describes what I think we shoulddo.
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As the dissent points out, “there are broad areas in which any attempt by the state to penalize purportedlyfalse speech would present a grave and unacceptable dan- ger of suppressing truthful speech.” Post, at 14. Laws restricting false statements about philosophy, religion,history, the social sciences, the arts, and the like raise such concerns, and in many contexts have called for strict scrutiny. But this case does not involve such a law. The dangers of suppressing valuable ideas are lower where, ashere, the regulations concern false statements about easilyverifiable facts that do not concern such subject matter.Such false factual statements are less likely than are truefactual statements to make a valuable contribution to the marketplace of ideas. And the government often hasgood reasons to prohibit such false speech. See infra, at 5–7 (listing examples of statutes and doctrines regulating false factual speech). But its regulation can nonetheless threaten speech-related harms. Those circumstances lead me to apply what the Court has termed “intermediatescrutiny” here.
II
A
The Stolen Valor Act makes it a crime “falsely” to “represen[t]” oneself “to have been awarded any decoration ormedal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces ofthe United States.” 18 U. S. C. §704(b). I would read the statute favorably to the Government as criminalizing only false factual statements made with knowledge of their falsity and with the intent that they be taken as true. See Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 605 (1994) (courtsconstrue statutes “in light of the background rules of the common law, . . . in which the requirement of some mens rea for a crime is firmly embedded”); cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279–280 (1964) (First Amendment allows a public official to recover for defama4
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BREYER, J., concurring in judgment
tion only upon a showing of “‘actual malice'”). As so interpreted the statute covers only lies. But although this interpretation diminishes the extent to which the statuteendangers First Amendment values, it does not eliminatethe threat.
I must concede, as the Government points out, that thisCourt has frequently said or implied that false factual statements enjoy little First Amendment protection. See, e.g., BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U. S. 516, 531 (2002) (“[F]alse statements may be unprotected for their own sake”); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46, 52 (1988) (“False statements of fact are particularly valueless”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[T]he erroneous statement of fact is not worthy ofconstitutional protection”).
But these judicial statements cannot be read to mean“no protection at all.” False factual statements can serve useful human objectives, for example: in social contexts, where they may prevent embarrassment, protect privacy, shield a person from prejudice, provide the sick with comfort, or preserve a child's innocence; in public contexts, where they may stop a panic or otherwise preserve calm in the face of danger; and even in technical, philosophical,and scientific contexts, where (as Socrates' methods suggest) examination of a false statement (even if made deliberately to mislead) can promote a form of thought that ultimately helps realize the truth. See, e.g., 638 F. 3d 666, 673–675 (CA9 2011) (Kozinski, J., concurring in denialof rehearing en banc) (providing numerous examples); S. Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (1999) (same); New York Times Co., supra, at 279, n. 19 (“Even afalse statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about ‘the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error'” (quoting J. Mill, On Liberty 15(Blackwell ed. 1947))).
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Moreover, as the Court has often said, the threat of criminal prosecution for making a false statement can inhibit the speaker from making true statements, thereby “chilling” a kind of speech that lies at the First Amendment's heart. See, e.g., Gertz, supra, at 340–341. Hence, the Court emphasizes mens rea requirements that provide “breathing room” for more valuable speech by reducing anhonest speaker's fear that he may accidentally incur liability for speaking.
Further, the pervasiveness of false statements, madefor better or for worse motives, made thoughtlessly or de- liberately, made with or without accompanying harm,provides a weapon to a government broadly empowered to prosecute falsity without more. And those who are unpopular may fear that the government will use thatweapon selectively, say by prosecuting a pacifist who sup- ports his cause by (falsely) claiming to have been a war hero, while ignoring members of other political groups who might make similar false claims.
I also must concede that many statutes and commonlaw doctrines make the utterance of certain kinds of false statements unlawful. Those prohibitions, however, tend tobe narrower than the statute before us, in that they limitthe scope of their application, sometimes by requiring proof of specific harm to identifiable victims; sometimes byspecifying that the lies be made in contexts in which a tangible harm to others is especially likely to occur; and sometimes by limiting the prohibited lies to those that areparticularly likely to produce harm.
Fraud statutes, for example, typically require proof of a misrepresentation that is material, upon which the victimrelied, and which caused actual injury. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §525 (1976). Defamation statutes focus upon statements of a kind that harm the reputation ofanother or deter third parties from association or dealing with the victim. See id., §§558, 559. Torts involving the
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intentional infliction of emotional distress (like torts involving placing a victim in a false light) concern falsehoodsthat tend to cause harm to a specific victim of an emotional-,dignitary-, or privacy-related kind. See id., §652E.
Perjury statutes prohibit a particular set of false statements—those made under oath—while requiring a showing of materiality. See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §1621. Statutes forbidding lying to a government official (not under oath) are typically limited to circumstances where a lie is likely to work particular and specific harm by interfering withthe functioning of a government department, and thosestatutes also require a showing of materiality. See, e.g.,§1001.
Statutes prohibiting false claims of terrorist attacks, orother lies about the commission of crimes or catastrophes,require proof that substantial public harm be directly foreseeable, or, if not, involve false statements that are very likely to bring about that harm. See, e.g., 47 CFR §73.1217 (2011) (requiring showing of foreseeability and actual substantial harm); 18 U. S. C. §1038(a)(1) (prohibiting knowing false statements claiming that terrorist attacks have taken, are taking, or will take, place).
Statutes forbidding impersonation of a public official typically focus on acts of impersonation, not mere speech, and may require a showing that, for example, someone was deceived into following a “course [of action] he would not have pursued but for the deceitful conduct.” United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U. S. 702, 704 (1943); see, e.g.,§912 (liability attaches to “[w]hoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States . . . and acts as such” (emphasis added)).
Statutes prohibiting trademark infringement present,perhaps, the closest analogy to the present statute.Trademarks identify the source of a good; and infringement causes harm by causing confusion among potential
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customers (about the source) and thereby diluting thevalue of the mark to its owner, to consumers, and to the econ- omy. Similarly, a false claim of possession of a medal or other honor creates confusion about who is entitled to wear it, thus diluting its value to those who have earned it, to their families, and to their country. But trademark statutes are focused upon commercial and promotionalactivities that are likely to dilute the value of a mark.Indeed, they typically require a showing of likely confusion, a showing that tends to assure that the feared harmwill in fact take place. See 15 U. S. C. §1114(1)(a); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U. S. 111, 117 (2004); see also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U. S. 522, 539–540, 548 (1987) (upholding statute giving theUnited States Olympic Committee the right to prohibit certain commercial and promotional uses of the word “Olympic”).
While this list is not exhaustive, it is sufficient to show that few statutes, if any, simply prohibit without limitation the telling of a lie, even a lie about one particular matter. Instead, in virtually all these instances limitations of context, requirements of proof of injury, and thelike, narrow the statute to a subset of lies where specific harm is more likely to occur. The limitations help to make certain that the statute does not allow its threat of liability or criminal punishment to roam at large, discouragingor forbidding the telling of the lie in contexts where harm is unlikely or the need for the prohibition is small.
The statute before us lacks any such limiting features. It may be construed to prohibit only knowing and intentional acts of deception about readily verifiable facts within the personal knowledge of the speaker, thus reducing the risk that valuable speech is chilled. Supra, at 3–4. But it still ranges very broadly. And that breadth means that it creates a significant risk of First Amendment
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harm. As written, it applies in family, social, or other private contexts, where lies will often cause little harm. It also applies in political contexts, where although such lies are more likely to cause harm, the risk of censorious se- lectivity by prosecutors is also high. Further, given thepotential haziness of individual memory along with thelarge number of military awards covered (ranging frommedals for rifle marksmanship to the Congressional Medal of Honor), there remains a risk of chilling that is not completely eliminated by mens rea requirements; a speaker might still be worried about being prosecuted for a careless false statement, even if he does not have the intent required to render him liable. And so the prohibition may be applied where it should not be applied, for example, to bar stool braggadocio or, in the political arena, subtly butselectively to speakers that the Government does not like.These considerations lead me to believe that the statute as written risks significant First Amendment harm.
B Like both the plurality and the dissent, I believe the statute nonetheless has substantial justification. It seeks to protect the interests of those who have sacrificed their health and life for their country. The statute serves this interest by seeking to preserve intact the country's recognition of that sacrifice in the form of military honors. To permit those who have not earned those honors to claim otherwise dilutes the value of the awards. Indeed, the Nation cannot fully honor those who have sacrificed somuch for their country's honor unless those who claim to have received its military awards tell the truth. Thus, the statute risks harming protected interests but only in order to achieve a substantial countervailing objective.
C We must therefore ask whether it is possible substanCite
as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 9
BREYER, J., concurring in judgment
tially to achieve the Government's objective in less burdensome ways. In my view, the answer to this question is “yes.” Some potential First Amendment threats can bealleviated by interpreting the statute to require knowledge of falsity, etc. Supra, at 3–4. But other First Amendment risks, primarily risks flowing from breadth of coverage, remain. Supra, at 4–5, 7–8. As is indicated by the limitations on the scope of the many other kinds of statutes regulating false factual speech, supra, at 5–7, it should be possible significantly to diminish or eliminate these re- maining risks by enacting a similar but more finely tailored statute. For example, not all military awards are alike. Congress might determine that some warrantgreater protection than others. And a more finely tailored statute might, as other kinds of statutes prohibiting false factual statements have done, insist upon a showing that the false statement caused specific harm or at least was material, or focus its coverage on lies most likely to beharmful or on contexts where such lies are most likely tocause harm.
I recognize that in some contexts, particularly politicalcontexts, such a narrowing will not always be easy to achieve. In the political arena a false statement is more likely to make a behavioral difference (say, by leading thelisteners to vote for the speaker) but at the same time criminal prosecution is particularly dangerous (say, byradically changing a potential election result) and consequently can more easily result in censorship of speakersand their ideas. Thus, the statute may have to be significantly narrowed in its applications. Some lower courts have upheld the constitutionality of roughly comparablebut narrowly tailored statutes in political contexts. See, e.g., United We Stand America, Inc. v. United We Stand, America New York, Inc., 128 F. 3d 86, 93 (CA2 1997) (upholding against First Amendment challenge application of Lanham Act to a political organization); Treasure of
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the Committee to Elect Gerald D. Lostracco v. Fox, 150 Mich. App. 617, 389 N. W. 2d 446 (1986) (upholding under First Amendment statute prohibiting campaign materialfalsely claiming that one is an incumbent). Without expressing any view on the validity of those cases, I would also note, like the plurality, that in this area more accurate information will normally counteract the lie. And an accurate, publicly available register of military awards, easily obtainable by political opponents, may well adequately protect the integrity of an award against thosewho would falsely claim to have earned it. See ante, at 17–18. And so it is likely that a more narrowly tailored statute combined with such information-disseminating devices will effectively serve Congress' end.
The Government has provided no convincing explanation as to why a more finely tailored statute would notwork. In my own view, such a statute could significantly reduce the threat of First Amendment harm while permitting the statute to achieve its important protective objective. That being so, I find the statute as presently drafted works disproportionate constitutional harm. It consequently fails intermediate scrutiny, and so violates the First Amendment.
For these reasons, I concur in the Court's judgment.
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ALITO, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 11–210
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. XAVIER ALVAREZ
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June 28, 2012]
JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUS-TICE THOMAS join, dissenting.
Only the bravest of the brave are awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, but the Court today holds thatevery American has a constitutional right to claim to have received this singular award. The Court strikes down the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, which was enacted to stem an epidemic of false claims about military decorations. These lies, Congress reasonably concluded, were undermining our country's system of military honors and inflicting real harm on actual medal recipients and their families.
Building on earlier efforts to protect the military awardssystem, Congress responded to this problem by crafting a narrow statute that presents no threat to the freedom ofspeech. The statute reaches only knowingly false statements about hard facts directly within a speaker's per- sonal knowledge. These lies have no value in and of themselves, and proscribing them does not chill anyvaluable speech.
By holding that the First Amendment neverthelessshields these lies, the Court breaks sharply from a long line of cases recognizing that the right to free speech does not protect false factual statements that inflict real harmand serve no legitimate interest. I would adhere to that principle and would thus uphold the constitutionality ofthis valuable law.
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I
The Stolen Valor Act makes it a misdemeanor to “falsely represen[t]” oneself as having been awarded a medal,decoration, or badge for service in the Armed Forces of the United States. 18 U. S. C. §704(b). Properly construed,this statute is limited in five significant respects. First, the Act applies to only a narrow category of false re