Sentenza

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES MOHAMAD, INDIVIDUALLY AND FOR ESTATE OF RAHIM, DECEASED, ET AL. v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
MOHAMAD, INDIVIDUALLY AND FOR ESTATE OF RAHIM,
DECEASED, ET AL. v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 11–88. Argued February 28, 2012—Decided April 18, 2012
While visiting the West Bank, Azzam Rahim, a naturalized UnitedStates citizen, allegedly was arrested by Palestinian Authority intelligence officers, imprisoned, tortured, and ultimately killed. Rahim's relatives, petitioners here, sued the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), which authorizes a cause of actionagainst “[a]n individual” for acts of torture and extrajudicial killingcommitted under authority or color of law of any foreign nation. 106 Stat. 73, note following 28 U. S. C. §1350. The District Court dismissed the suit, concluding, as relevant here, that the TVPA's authorization of suit against “[a]n individual” extended liability only tonatural persons. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Held: As used in the TVPA, the term “individual” encompasses onlynatural persons. Consequently, the Act does not impose liabilityagainst organizations. Pp. 2–11.
(a)
The ordinary, everyday meaning of “individual” refers to a human being, not an organization, and Congress in the normal coursedoes not employ the word any differently. The Dictionary Act defines “person” to include certain artificial entities “as well as individuals,”1 U. S. C. §1, thereby marking “individual” as distinct from artificialentities. Federal statutes routinely distinguish between an “individual” and an organizational entity. See, e.g., 7 U. S. C. §§92(k), 511.And the very Congress that passed the TVPA defined “person” in a separate Act to include “any individual or entity.” 18 U. S. C.
2 MOHAMAD v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
Syllabus
§2331(3). Pp. 2–5.
(b)
Before a word will be assumed to have a meaning broader thanor different from its ordinary meaning, Congress must give some indication that it intended such a result. There are no such indications in the TVPA. To the contrary, the statutory context confirms thatCongress in the Act created a cause of action against natural personsalone. The Act's liability provision uses the word “individual” five times in the same sentence: once to refer to the perpetrator and fourtimes to refer to the victim. See TVPA §2(a). Since only a natural person can be a victim of torture or extrajudicial killing, it is difficultto conclude that Congress used “individual” four times in the samesentence to refer to a natural person and once to refer to a natural person and any nonsovereign organization. In addition, the TVPA holds perpetrators liable for extrajudicial killing to “any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.” See TVPA §2(a)(2). “Persons” often has a broader meaning in the law than “individual,” and frequently includes non-natural persons. Construing“individual” in the Act to encompass solely natural persons creditsCongress' use of disparate terms. Pp. 5–6.
(c) Petitioners' counterarguments are unpersuasive. Pp. 6–11.
(1)
Petitioners dispute that the plain text of the TVPA requires this Court's result. First, they rely on definitions that frame “individual” in nonhuman terms, emphasizing the idea of “oneness,” butthese definitions make for an awkward fit in the context of the TVPA. Next they claim that federal tort statutes uniformly provide for liability against organizations, a convention they maintain is common tothe legal systems of other nations. But while “Congress is understood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatoryprinciples,” Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 108, Congress plainly evinced its intent in the TVPA not to subject organizations to liability. Petitioners next argue that the TVPA'sscope of liability should be construed to conform with other federal statutes they claim provide civil remedies to victims of torture or extrajudicial killing. But none of the statutes petitioners cite employs the term “individual,” as the TVPA, to describe the covered defendant. Finally, although petitioners rightly note that the TVPA contemplates liability against officers who do not personally execute the torture or extrajudicial killing, it does not follow that the Act embraces liability against nonsovereign organizations. Pp. 6–8.
(2)
Petitioners also contend that legislative history supports theirbroad reading of “individual,” but “reliance on legislative history is unnecessary in light of the statute's unambiguous language.” Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P. A. v. United States, 559 U. S. ___, ___. In any event, the history supports this Court's interpretation. Pp. 8–10.
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 3
Syllabus
(3)
Finally, petitioners argue that precluding organizational liability may foreclose effective remedies for victims and their relatives.This purposive argument simply cannot overcome the force of theplain text. Moreover, Congress appeared well aware of the limitednature of the cause of action it established in the TVPA. Pp. 10–11.
634 F. 3d 604, affirmed.
SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN, JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined except as to Part III–B. BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion.
_________________
_________________
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in thepreliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested tonotify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in orderthat corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 11–88
ASID MOHAMAD, INDIVIDUALLY AND FOR THE ESTATE OF
AZZAM RAHIM, DECEASED, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[April 18, 2012]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.*
The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA orAct), 106 Stat. 73, note following 28 U. S. C. §1350, authorizes a cause of action against “[a]n individual” for actsof torture and extrajudicial killing committed under authority or color of law of any foreign nation. We hold that the term “individual” as used in the Act encompasses only natural persons. Consequently, the Act does not imposeliability against organizations.
I Because this case arises from a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the allegations of the complaint. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 1). Petitioners are the relatives of Azzam Rahim, who immigrated tothe United States in the 1970's and became a naturalized citizen. In 1995, while on a visit to the West Bank, Rahim was arrested by Palestinian Authority intelligence officers. He was taken to a prison in Jericho, where he was impris——————
* JUSTICE SCALIA joins this opinion except as to Part III–B.
2 MOHAMAD v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court
oned, tortured, and ultimately killed. The following year,the U. S. Department of State issued a report concludingthat Rahim “died in the custody of [Palestinian Authority]intelligence officers in Jericho.” Dept. of State, Occupied Territories Human Rights Practices, 1995 (Mar. 1996).
In 2005, petitioners filed this action against respondents, the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization, asserting, inter alia, claims of torture and extrajudicial killing under the TVPA. The District Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss, concluding, as relevant, that the Act's authorization of suit against “[a]n individual” extended liability only to natural persons. Mohamad v. Rajoub, 664 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (DC 2009). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed on the same ground. See Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F. 3d 604, 608 (2011) (“Congress used the word ‘individual' to denote only natural persons”).1 We granted certiorari, 565 U. S. ___ (2011), toresolve a split among the Circuits with respect to whether the TVPA authorizes actions against defendants that are not natural persons,2 and now affirm.
II
The TVPA imposes liability on individuals for certain acts of torture and extrajudicial killing. The Act provides: “An individual who, under actual or apparent authority,
or color of law, of any foreign nation— ——————
1Respondents also argued before the District Court that the TVPA'srequirement that acts be committed under authority or color of law ofa foreign nation was not met. Neither the District Court nor Court of Appeals addressed the argument, and we offer no opinion on its merits.
2Compare Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F. 3d 388 (CA4 2011) (TVPA excludes corporate defendants from liability); Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634
F. 3d 604 (CADC 2011) (TVPA liability limited to natural persons); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F. 3d 1116 (CA9 2010) (same as Aziz),with Sinaltrainal v. Coca Cola Co., 578 F. 3d 1252, 1264, n. 13 (CA112009) (TVPA liability extends to corporate defendants).
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 3
Opinion of the Court
“(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil
action, be liable for damages to that individual; or
“(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing
shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual's
legal representative, or to any person who
may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.”
§2(a).
The Act defines “torture” and “extrajudicial killing,” §3, and imposes a statute of limitations and an exhaustionrequirement, §§2(b), (c). It does not define “individual.”
Petitioners concede that foreign states may not be suedunder the Act—namely, that the Act does not create an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of1976, 28 U. S. C. §1602 et seq., which renders foreignsovereigns largely immune from suits in U. S. courts. They argue, however, that the TVPA does not similarly restrict liability against other juridical entities. In petitioners' view, by permitting suit against “[a]n individual,” the TVPA contemplates liability against natural persons and nonsovereign organizations (a category that, petitioners assert, includes respondents). We decline to read “individual” so unnaturally. The ordinary meaning of theword, fortified by its statutory context, persuades us that the Act authorizes suit against natural persons alone.
A Because the TVPA does not define the term “individual,” we look first to the word's ordinary meaning. See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 5) (“When a statute does not define a term, we typically give thephrase its ordinary meaning” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As a noun, “individual” ordinarily means “[a]human being, a person.” 7 Oxford English Dictionary 880 (2d ed. 1989); see also, e.g., Random House Dictionaryof the English Language 974 (2d ed. 1987) (“a person”); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1152 (1986)
4 MOHAMAD v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court
(“a particular person”) (hereinafter Webster's). After all, that is how we use the word in everyday parlance. We say“the individual went to the store,” “the individual left the room,” and “the individual took the car,” each time referring unmistakably to a natural person. And no one, we hazard to guess, refers in normal parlance to an organization as an “individual.” Evidencing that common usage,this Court routinely uses “individual” to denote a naturalperson, and in particular to distinguish between a naturalperson and a corporation. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U. S. __, __ (2011) (slip op., at 7) (“For an individual, the paradigm forumfor the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home”).
Congress does not, in the ordinary course, employ theword any differently. The Dictionary Act instructs that“[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the wor[d]‘person' . . . include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.” 1 U. S. C. §1 (emphasis added). With the phrase “as well as,” the definition marks“individual” as distinct from the list of artificial entities that precedes it.
In a like manner, federal statutes routinely distinguishbetween an “individual” and an organizational entity of some kind. See, e.g., 7 U. S. C. §92(k) (“‘Person' includes partnerships, associations, and corporations, as well asindividuals”); §511 (same); 15 U. S. C. §717a (“‘Person'includes an individual or a corporation”); 16 U. S. C. §796(“‘[P]erson' means an individual or a corporation”); 8
U. S. C. §1101(b)(3) (“‘[P]erson' means an individual or anorganization”). Indeed, the very same Congress thatenacted the TVPA also established a cause of action for
U. S. nationals injured “by reason of an act of internaCite
as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 5
Opinion of the Court
tional terrorism” and defined “person” as it appears inthe statute to include “any individual or entity capable ofholding a legal or beneficial interest in property.” Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, 18 U. S. C. §§2333(a),2331(3) (emphasis added)).
B This is not to say that the word “individual” invariablymeans “natural person” when used in a statute. Congressremains free, as always, to give the word a broader ordifferent meaning. But before we will assume it has done so, there must be some indication Congress intended such a result. Perhaps it is the rare statute (petitioners point to only one such example, located in the Internal Revenue Code) in which Congress expressly defines “individual” toinclude corporate entities. See 26 U. S. C. §542(a)(2). Or perhaps, as was the case in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U. S. 417, 429 (1998), the statutory context makes that intention clear, because any other reading of “individual” would lead to an “‘absurd'” result Congress could not plausibly have intended.There are no such indications in the TVPA. As noted, the Act does not define “individual,” much less do so in a manner that extends the term beyond its ordinary usage.And the statutory context strengthens—not undermines—the conclusion that Congress intended to create a cause ofaction against natural persons alone. The Act's liability provision uses the word “individual” five times in the samesentence: once to refer to the perpetrator (i.e., the defendant) and four times to refer to the victim. See §2(a). Onlya natural person can be a victim of torture or extrajudicialkilling. “Since there is a presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute, a presumption surely at its most vigorous when a term isrepeated within a given sentence,” Brown v. Gardner, 513
U. S. 115, 118 (1994) (citation omitted), it is difficult in6
MOHAMAD v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court
deed to conclude that Congress employed the term “individual” four times in one sentence to refer to a natural person and once to refer to a natural person and any nonsovereign organization. See also §3(b)(1) (using term“individual” six times in referring to victims of torture).
It is also revealing that the Act holds perpetrators liable for extrajudicial killing to “any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.” §2(a)(2) (emphasis added). “Person,” we have recognized, often has abroader meaning in the law than “individual,” see Clinton, 524 U. S., at 428, n. 13, and frequently includes nonnatural persons, see, e.g., 1 U. S. C. §1. We generally seekto respect Congress' decision to use different terms to describe different categories of people or things. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692, 711, n. 9 (2004). Our construction of “individual” to encompass solely natural persons credits Congress' use of the disparate terms;petitioners' construction does not.3
In sum, the text of the statute persuades us that the Actauthorizes liability solely against natural persons.
III
Petitioners' counterarguments are unpersuasive.
A Petitioners first dispute that the plain text of the TVPArequires today's result. Although they concede that anordinary meaning of “individual” is “human being,” petitioners point to definitions of “individual” that “frame the term . . . in distinctly non-human terms, instead placing their emphases on the oneness of something.” Brief for
—————— 3The parties debate whether estates, or other nonnatural persons, infact may be claimants in a wrongful-death action. We think the debate largely immaterial. Regardless of whether jurisdictions today allow for such actions, Congress' use of the broader term evidences an intent toaccommodate that possibility.
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 7
Opinion of the Court
Petitioners 18 (citing, e.g., Webster's 1152 (defining “individual” as “a single or particular being or thing or groupof being or things”)). Those definitions, however, do not account even for petitioners' preferred interpretation of “individual” in the Act, for foreign states—which petitioners concede are not liable under the Act—do not differ from nonsovereign organizations in their degree of “oneness.” Moreover, “[w]ords that can have more than onemeaning are given content . . . by their surroundings,” Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 466 (2001), and for the reasons explained supra, petitioners' definition makes for an awkward fit in the context of the TVPA.
Petitioners next claim that federal tort statutes uniformly provide for liability against organizations, a convention they maintain is common to the legal systems of other nations. We are not convinced, however, that any such “domestic and international presumption of organizational liability” in tort actions overcomes the ordi- nary meaning of “individual.” Brief for Petitioners 16. It is true that “Congress is understood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles.” Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 108 (1991). But Congress plainly can override those principles, see, e.g., id., at 108–109, and, as explained supra, the TVPA's text evinces a clear intent not to subject nonsovereign organizations to liability.4
—————— 4Petitioners' separate contention that the TVPA must be construed in light of international agreements prohibiting torture and extrajudicial killing fails for similar reasons. Whatever the scope of those agreements, the TVPA does not define “individual” by reference to them, and principles they elucidate cannot overcome the statute's text. The same is true of petitioners' suggestion that Congress in the TVPA imported a “specialized usage” of the word “individual” in internationallaw. Brief for Petitioners 6. There is no indication in the text of the statute or legislative history that Congress knew of any such specialized usage of the term, much less intended to import it into the Act.
8 MOHAMAD v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court
We also decline petitioners' suggestion to construe theTVPA's scope of liability to conform with other federalstatutes that petitioners contend provide civil remedies to victims of torture or extrajudicial killing. None of the three statutes petitioners identify employs the term “individual” to describe the covered defendant, and so none assists in the interpretive task we face today. See 42
U. S. C. §1983; 28 U. S. C. §§1603(a), 1605A(c) (2006 ed., Supp. IV); 18 U. S. C. §§2333, 2334(a)–(b), 2337. The same is true of the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U. S. C. §1350, soit offers no comparative value here regardless of whethercorporate entities can be held liable in a federal commonlaw action brought under that statute. Compare Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F. 3d 11 (CADC 2011), with Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F. 3d 111 (CA2 2010), cert. granted, 565 U. S. ___ (2011). Finally, although petitioners rightly note that the TVPA contemplates liability against officers who do not personallyexecute the torture or extrajudicial killing, see, e.g., Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F. 3d 486 (CA6 2009), it does not follow (as petitioners argue) that the Act embraces liability against nonsovereign organizations. An officer who gives an order to torture or kill is an “individual” in that word's ordinary usage; an organization is not.
B Petitioners also contend that legislative history supportstheir broad reading of “individual.” But “reliance on legislative history is unnecessary in light of the statute's unambiguous language.” Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P. A.
v. United States, 559 U. S. ___, ___, n. 3 (2010) (slip op., at 6, n. 3). In any event, the excerpts petitioners cite do nothelp their cause. Petitioners note that the Senate Report states that “[t]he legislation uses the term ‘individual' to make crystal clear that foreign states or their entitiescannot be sued under this bill under any circumstances.”
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 9
Opinion of the Court
S. Rep. No. 102–249, p. 7 (1991) (S. Rep.); see also H. R.Rep. No. 102–367, pt. 1, p. 4 (1991) (H. R. Rep.) (“Only‘individuals,' not foreign states, can be sued”). Yet that statement, while clarifying that the Act does not encompass liability against foreign states, says nothing about liability against nonsovereign organizations. The other excerpts petitioners cite likewise are not probative of the meaning of “individual,” for they signal only that the Act does not impose liability on perpetrators who act without authority or color of law of a foreign state. See, e.g., H. R. Rep., at 5 (“The bill does not attempt to deal with torture or killing by purely private groups”); S. Rep., at 8 (The bill“does not cover purely private criminal acts by individualsor nongovernmental organizations”).
Indeed, although we need not rely on legislative history given the text's clarity, we note that the history only supports our interpretation of “individual.” The version of the TVPA that was introduced in the 100th Congress established liability against a “person.” Hearing and Markupon H. R. 1417 before the House Committee on ForeignAffairs and Its Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 82(1988). During the markup session of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, one of the bill's sponsors proposed an amendment “to make it clear we are applying it to individuals and not to corporations.” Id., at 81, 87. Counsel explained that it was a “fairly simple” matter “of changing the word ‘person' to ‘individuals' in several places in thebill.” Id., at 87–88. The amendment was unanimouslyadopted, and the version of the bill reported out of Committee reflected the change. Id., at 88; H. R. Rep. No. 693, pt. 1, p. 1 (1988). A materially identical version of the billwas enacted as the TVPA by the 102d Congress. Althoughwe are cognizant of the limitations of this drafting history,cf. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545
U. S. 546, 568 (2005), we nevertheless find it telling that
10 MOHAMAD v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court
the sole explanation for substituting “individual” for “person” confirms what we have concluded from the text alone.
C Petitioners' final argument is that the Act would be rendered toothless by a construction of “individual” thatlimits liability to natural persons. They contend that precluding organizational liability may foreclose effective remedies for victims and their relatives for any number of reasons. Victims may be unable to identify the men and women who subjected them to torture, all the while knowing the organization for whom they work. Personal jurisdiction may be more easily established over corporate than human beings. And natural persons may be more likely than organizations to be judgment proof. Indeed, we are told that only two TVPA plaintiffs have been able to recover successfully against a natural person—one only after the defendant won the state lottery. See Jean v. Dorelien, 431 F. 3d 776, 778 (CA11 2005).We acknowledge petitioners' concerns about the limitations on recovery. But they are ones that Congress imposed and that we must respect. “[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs,” Rodriguez v. United States, 480
U. S. 522, 525–526 (1987) (per curiam), and petitioners' purposive argument simply cannot overcome the force of the plain text. We add only that Congress appeared well aware of the limited nature of the cause of action it established in the Act. See, e.g., 138 Cong. Rec. 4177 (1992) (remarks of Sen. Simpson) (noting that “as a practical matter, this legislation will result in a very small numberof cases”); 137 Cong. Rec. 2671 (1991) (remarks of Sen.Specter) (“Let me emphasize that the bill is a limited measure. It is estimated that only a few of these lawsuits will ever be brought”).
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 11
Opinion of the Court
* * *
The text of the TVPA convinces us that Congress did not extend liability to organizations, sovereign or not. There are no doubt valid arguments for such an extension. But Congress has seen fit to proceed in more modest steps in the Act, and it is not the province of this Branch to dootherwise. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
_________________
_________________
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 1
BREYER, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 11–88
ASID MOHAMAD, INDIVIDUALLY AND FOR THE ESTATE OF
AZZAM RAHIM, DECEASED, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[April 18, 2012]
JUSTICE BREYER, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion with one qualification. The word “individual” is open to multiple interpretations,permitting it, linguistically speaking, to include naturalpersons, corporations, and other entities. Thus, I do not believe that word alone is sufficient to decide this case.
The legislative history of the statute, however, makes up for whatever interpretive inadequacies remain after considering language alone. See, e.g., ante, at 9 (describ- ing markup session in which one of the bill's sponsorsproposed an amendment containing the word “individual” to “make it clear” that the statute applied to “individualsand not to corporations”); Hearing on S. 1629 et al. be- fore the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairsof the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 65 (1990) (witness explaining to committee thatthere would be a “problem” with suing an “independent entity or a series of entities that are not governments,” suchas the Palestine Liberation Organization); id., at 75 (allaying concerns that there will be a flood of lawsuits“because of the requirement [in the statute] that an individual has to identify his or her precise torture[r] and theyhave to be both in the United States”); see also ante, at 8– 9 (making clear that petitioners' citations to the legislative
2 MOHAMAD v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
BREYER, J., concurring
history “do not help their cause”). After examining the history in detail, and considering it along with the reasonsthat the Court provides, I join the Court's judgment andopinion.